One prominent hypothesis about illnesses among Gulf War veterans is that some reported symptoms may have resulted from exposure to chemical warfare agents. During and after the Gulf War, some veterans reported they had been exposed to chemical warfare agents. To investigate these incidents and assess the likelihood of chemical warfare agents' presence in the Gulf, the Department of Defense developed a methodology for investigation and validation based on work of the United Nations and international community. The investigation examines these factors:

• A detailed written record of the conditions at the site;
• Physical evidence from the site, e.g., weapons fragments and soil, water, vegetation or human, or animal tissue samples;
• A record of the chain of custody during transportation of the evidence;
Testimony of witnesses;
• Several analyses; and
• A review of the evidence by experts.

While our investigative methodology (more fully described in Tab C) is based on these factors, the passage of time since the Gulf War makes it difficult to obtain certain types of documentary evidence, and physical evidence often was not collected when an event occurred. Therefore, we cannot apply a rigid template to all incidents, and must tailor each investigation to its unique circumstances. Accordingly, we designed our investigative methodology to thoroughly define each incident's circumstances and determine what happened. Alarms alone are not certain evidence of chemical warfare agent presence, nor is a single observation sufficient to validate the presence of a chemical warfare agent.

Following our methodology, we accumulate anecdotal, documentary, and physical evidence; interview witnesses and key servicemembers; and analyze the results of all available information. The investigator then assesses the possibility of the presence of chemical warfare agents on the battlefield. Because we do not expect to always have conclusive evidence, we developed an assessment scale (Figure 1) ranging from Definitely Not to Definitely, with intermediate assessments of Unlikely, Indeterminate, and Likely. This assessment is our best judgment, based on facts available on the report publication date; we reassess each case over time based on new information and feedback.

Figure 1. Assessment of Chemical Warfare Agent Presence

The standard for making the assessment is based on common sense: do the available facts lead a reasonable person to conclude that chemical warfare agents were present or not? If insufficient information is available, the assessment is Indeterminate until more evidence emerges. The UK Ministry of Defence has conducted its investigation along similar lines, relying on documentary evidence and the testimony of key witnesses.

In early August 1991, personnel from Passive Barriers Limited, a British explosive ordnance firm, discovered a storage tank believed to contain chemical warfare agent next to the perimeter wall of the Kuwaiti Girls' School in Kuwait City, Kuwait. Witnesses described the tank as emitting brown vapors through two bullet holes in the tank. Initial field tests suggested the possible presence of mustard agent, but the results were inconclusive. American and British military personnel conducted four operations in August 1991 to determine if the tank contained chemical warfare agent and to permanently seal the holes in the tank.

Maj. Jonathan Watkinson, commander of the 21st Explosive Ordnance Disposal Squadron, British Royal Engineers, commanded joint British and American operations to identify the contents of the tank. He used several types of chemical warfare agent detection equipment including a Chemical Agent Monitor, both one- and three-color chemical warfare agent detector papers, and an M18A2 chemical warfare agent detection kit. The Chemical Agent Monitor registered 8 bars, a positive result, for mustard agent. The chemical warfare agent detector papers and the M18A2 kit produced inconclusive results. After Major Watkinson's initial tests, two Fox nuclear, biological, and chemical reconnaissance vehicles sent to the girls' school initially alerted for the possible presence of the chemical warfare agents mustard and phosgene. MM-1 initial alerts, however, do not verify the presence of chemical warfare agents. The Fox crews took additional steps, known as spectrum analyses, that disproved the initial results of mustard and phosgene but indicated the presence of an unknown substance.

To confirm the presence or absence of chemical warfare agents in the tank, a British sampling team extracted liquid from the tank for laboratory analysis. The samples remained in the custody of the sampling team or an authorized individual until delivered to the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment at Porton Down, United Kingdom. The United Nations had designated the laboratory at Porton Down as a preeminent authority to analyze samples of chemical warfare agents sent from Iraq. Scientists at the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment produced an initial report on the laboratory analyses of the samples taken from the tank. Their 1991 initial report stated that the samples were consistent with the tank containing nitric acid and there was no evidence of any chemical warfare agent in the tank.

In 1994, the tank found at the Kuwaiti Girls' School became a focus of government and media scrutiny in the U.S. and the United Kingdom when veterans and the general public feared possible exposure of soldiers to chemical warfare agents. The American public and Gulf War veterans suspected Iraq's chemical warfare agent inventory could be a possible cause of reported undiagnosed illnesses in Gulf War veterans. A contemporary press article that appeared in the British newspaper, The Sunday Observer, reported the 1991 discovery of a container full of mustard agent in Kuwait City, Kuwait. The U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs launched an investigation to determine if in fact the tank contained a chemical warfare agent, thus possibly exposing military personnel. The Senate committee reviewed documentation and interviewed U.S. military personnel who participated in the testing or sampling of the tank's contents at the Kuwaiti Girls' School. Although some of the initial results of Major Watkinson's field tests using various types of chemical detection equipment supported the Senate committee's conclusion that a chemical warfare agent may have been present in the tank, laboratory and Fox vehicle analysis did not. Despite the laboratory evidence to the contrary, the Senate committee disagreed with the DOD and concluded publicly that chemical warfare agent had been present in the storage tank. In the United Kingdom, parliamentary questions born out of the U.S. Senate committee's declaration have repeatedly been raised.

In 1997, the DOD commenced a joint investigation with the Ministry of Defence in the United Kingdom. This investigation revealed new evidence confirming the tank did not contain a chemical warfare agent, but most likely contained nitric acid. This evidence included copies of the two Fox vehicles' MM-1 mobile mass spectrometer tapes produced at the tank site on Aug. 9, 1991. Chemical experts at the Edgewood Research, Development, and Engineering Center, mass spectrum experts at the National Institute of Standards and Technology, and the manufacturer of the MM-1 mobile mass spectrometer all analyzed the mass spectrometer tapes produced at the tank site. They concluded definitively that the tank did not contain chemical warfare agent, but indicated the presence of nitric acid.

The liquid samples extracted from the tank at the Kuwaiti Girls' School provide physical evidence that the tank did not contain chemical warfare agent, but did contain nitric acid, most likely inhibited red fuming nitric acid. We acknowledge that the tank probably did not contain pure nitric acid, but more likely contained a mixture of nitric acid and other unknown substances or contaminants as a result of exposure to the environment (for example, water, sand, and pollutants). The tank emitted brown-colored fumes, indicating the tank contained red fuming nitric acid, which is composed of nitric acid, water, and several forms of nitrogen oxide. We also believe the tank contained an inhibitor due to the lack of corrosion of the tank as described by eyewitnesses. However, because the liquid sample was not tested specifically for an inhibitor, we cannot confirm with certainty what inhibitor, if any, was in the tank. Therefore, we conclude that the tank contained nitric acid-most likely inhibited red fuming nitric acid. This chemical is an oxidizer used in Seersucker missiles that were maintained at the girls' school.

In March 1998, the DOD, in cooperation with the United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, published the initial report of our investigation of a suspicious metal storage tank, believed to contain chemical warfare agent, discovered next to the perimeter wall of a girls' school in Kuwait City, Kuwait, following the Gulf War. Although we have not received any new evidence concerning this investigation, the Presidential Special Oversight Board reviewed the narrative and recommended that we amend and republish it as a final report after incorporating additional clarifying information. Consequently, this report provides more detail and a more accurate discussion of the events at the Kuwaiti Girls' School and the evidence about the tank's contents.

1. Location and Identification of the Kuwaiti Girls' School

In early March 1991, Coalition forces in Kuwait explored the Al Badawiyah Girls' Sciences School in the Al Badawiyah suburb of Kuwait City at coordinates 2904N4806E (Universal Transverse Mercator grid TN18832039).[2] (Figure 2).[3] The Al Badawiyah Girls' Sciences School has several different names: The Sabahiyah High School for Girls[4] and the Ansarieh Banat Kebeed School.[5] The school falls within the Sabahiyah municipality and the Badawiyah district and thus may also be known by locality.[6] In 1997, the school was named the Al Nasser School for Secondary Curriculum (Figure 3). Since that time, the United Kingdom (UK) Parliament, the United States (US) Senate and Department of Defense, and the media have referred to the building as the Kuwaiti Girls' School. Thus, for consistency, this report refers to it as the Kuwaiti Girls' School.

Figure 2. Map of Al Ahmadi district. Red arrow points to the Kuwaiti Girls' School.

Figure 3. Photograph of the front of the school taken during the Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses trip to Kuwait in October 1997. The sign on the building reads: Al Nasser School for Secondary Curriculum.

2. Iraq's Use of the Kuwaiti Girls' School as Missile Maintenance Facility

During the Gulf War, Iraq used the Kuwaiti Girls' School as a missile test and maintenance facility. A March 29, 1991, initial intelligence report stated Coalition forces found six Chinese-made Seersucker missiles, mistakenly referred to as Silkworm missiles, inside the building at the Kuwaiti Girls' School. (Figures 4 and 5). The report also noted the presence of missile test carts, cabling, two abandoned Soviet missile transport trucks next to a truck-mounted crane 100 meters west of the school, and a Chinese generator positioned 600 meters west of the school.[7] The initial intelligence report did not refer to any missile fuel or oxidizer storage tank near the school, but photography taken on March 1, 1991, does show the tank at the school (Figure 6).

Figure 4. Captured Iraqi Seersucker anti-ship missile from the Kuwait Girls' School. Photograph taken by US Naval officer, March 1991, at Shubaiha Port. Note the serial number on the missile circled above matches that of the missile in Figure 5.

Figure 5. This is a photograph of six Seersucker missiles captured at the Kuwaiti Girls' School awaiting transport to the US. Note the serial number on the first missile above matches that of the missile from the Kuwaiti Girls' school in Figure 4. Photograph taken by U.S. Naval officer, March 1991, at Shubaiha Port.

Figure 6. National Imagery and Mapping Agency, U2 reconnaissance photograph of the Kuwaiti Girls' School, March 1, 1991. The obstructed view is due to oil well fire smoke over the area.

3. Clearance of Unexploded Ordnance in Kuwait

Although the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency assessed before Operation Desert Storm that Iraq was "likely to have a CW [chemical warfare] warhead for its Silkworms,"[8] the missiles discovered at the Kuwaiti Girls' School had conventional, high explosive warheads.[9] A report on captured military hardware dated September 12, 1991, stated that 30 Silkworm warheads to be sent to the United States in September/October of 1991 would be available for evaluation.[10] The Terra Group, New Mexico Institute of Mining and Technology, received 19 warheads, nine warheads went to the Naval Warfare Center, China Lake, California, and the last two went to the Naval Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technical Center at Indian Head, Maryland.[11] According to the head of security for the New Mexico Institute of Mining and Technology, the paperwork for all 19 warheads indicated they were all high explosive, not chemical-filled. A representative from the Naval Warfare Center, China Lake, California, reported the nine warheads his organization destroyed were all high explosive warheads. A representative from the Naval Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technical Center at Indian Head, Maryland, indicated that he had not heard of warheads for Iraq's Silkworms that could carry chemical warfare agents. He also reported the two warheads sent to Indian Head were conventional, high explosive warheads.[12]

Following the expulsion of Iraq's military forces from Kuwait, the government of Kuwait began to rebuild the infrastructure damaged during Iraq's occupation. To help the Kuwaiti government coordinate this mission, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers established the Defense Reconstruction Assistance Office (DRAO) and the Kuwait Emergency Recovery Office (KERO). However, unexploded ordnance located throughout Kuwait impeded the reconstruction efforts. The government of Kuwait issued contracts to Coalition nations to clear unexploded ordnance within Kuwait. They divided the country into six sectors to distribute the work among Coalition forces, specifically the UK, US, France, Egypt, Bangladesh, and Pakistan.[13]

Each country approached the ordnance disposal mission slightly differently. Egypt, Bangladesh, and Pakistan assigned the duties to their own soldiers, while France the UK and the U.S. used contractors to accomplish the task.[14] The United Kingdom retained Royal Ordnance, a British firm specializing in explosive ordnance, to clear its sector. In turn, Royal Ordnance hired British soldiers trained in ordnance disposal from the UK MoD.

In early August 1991, a British explosive ordnance firm, Passive Barriers, was subcontracted by Brown and Root International Inc., an American firm hired by the U.S. government to manage reconstruction projects in the sector designated to the US for infrastructure repair. As the Kuwaiti Girls' School fell within the U.S. sector of responsibility, Brown and Root were responsible for its repair. According to the Brown and Root supervisor, the protocol for the reconstruction effort called for Passive Barriers to clear the area before Brown and Root commenced work. While clearing the area around the Kuwaiti Girls' School, Passive Barriers personnel discovered the storage tank next to the exterior side of the perimeter wall surrounding the Kuwaiti Girls' School (Figure 7). Passive Barriers notified Brown & Root management, who then asked KERO to send someone to survey the tank and identify its contents so that it could be disposed of safely.

Figure 7. Photographs of the storage tank at the Kuwaiti Girls' School taken by the safety officer in August 1991. Encircled areas show the movement of the fumes out of one of the bullet holes. (Photographs used by permission.)

Figure 8. Photographs of the storage tank at the Kuwaiti Girls' School taken by the safety officer in August 1991. Encircled areas show the movement of the fumes out of one of the bullet holes. (Photographs used by permission.)

Assigned to support the KERO, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers safety officer conducted the initial inspection of the tank. His inspection revealed rust-colored fumes emitting through two holes in the tank (Figure 8), an amount he equated to that of a heavily smoking cigar. A bullet had pierced the tank, had broken in half on entry, and part of the bullet remained at the exit hole.

The safety officer reported that he heard that the tank contained mustard agent, but recalled thinking at the time the fumes smelled like nitric acid. He tapped the tank to determine the fill level; it was approximately one-third full. Despite not wearing protective gear and being close to the fumes, the safety officer reported no symptoms of exposure to chemical warfare agent. The rust color, the acid smell of the fumes, and his lack of symptoms akin to mustard agent exposure led the safety officer to believe the tank likely contained nitric acid.[15] The safety officer was the only person who identified the acid smell of the fumes. After the safety officer's inspection, all other inspections of the tank were conducted wearing protective clothing and respirators.

The safety officer verbally reported the findings of his inspection, conveyed his belief the tank contained nitric acid, and relinquished his pictures of the tank to the DRAO operations officer, but did not prepare a written report of his inspection.[16] Maj. Gen. Patrick Kelly, the DRAO commander, visited the tank site and ordered an inspection of the tank. He also requested Kuwait's Army Chief of Staff send a team to secure the area.[17]

Concerns about the possibility that the tank contained chemical warfare agent and an overlap in responsibilities resulted in four separate related operations to test the contents of the tank. The operations consisted of the following:

1. Maj. Watkinson's initial tests;
2. the Fox vehicle testing; and
3. sampling of the tank's contents; and
4. field tests of the liquid from the tank on the protective clothing.

Following this final operation, the holes in the tank were permanently sealed.

Communication regarding each of the operations was limited for several reasons. The same individuals did not participate in all four operations, and often these individuals were not aware of the other operations. An abbreviated listing of the major individuals and organizations involved in testing the tank's contents is at Tab E. Because of the multiple actions at the tank, some individuals ended their involvement with limited information and unanswered questions about the exact nature of the tank's contents. For graphical representations of what each participant knew about the events as well as a timeline, see Tabs F and G. Also, the sectors delineated for ordnance clearing did not correspond to the boundaries used for reconstruction efforts. The Kuwaiti Girls' School, while in the sector assigned to the U.S. for reconstruction, was in the British sector for ordnance clearing.[18] Therefore, the British commanded all operations to test the tank's contents with assistance provided by U.S. forces. The multi-national participation in these operations ultimately affected the promptness in which information flowed to participants.

On Aug. 5, 1991, Kuwaiti military officers tasked the British firm, Royal Ordnance, to examine the tank at the Kuwaiti Girls' School. On loan to Royal Ordnance specifically to conduct ordnance disposal operations, the 21st EOD Squadron, British Royal Engineers, commanded by Maj. Jonathan Watkinson, set out to investigate the tank. At the same time, a U.S. Brigadier General in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, tasked the commanding officer of the U.S. 146th EOD Detachment to investigate the tank, and expressed concern that the tank "possibly contained mustard agent."[19] In 1997, Maj. Watkinson described this assignment:

I attended a meeting on the 5th of August [1991] with the Kuwaiti Ministry of Defence which was a regular meeting, between Kuwaiti Army Officers and various agencies in Kuwait, who were involved in EOD operations. It was at that meeting that I first became aware of the container, because one of the Kuwaiti officers specifically asked Royal Ordnance if they could investigate it. A member of the Royal Ordnance management team was at that meeting and they immediately referred the problem to me to investigate, which I subsequently did...[20]

On Aug. 5, 1991, the commanding officer of the U.S. 146th EOD Detachment reported that he accompanied Maj. Watkinson to the Kuwaiti Girls' School to examine the tank and search the site for additional tanks and other suspicious items.[21] However, Maj. Watkinson does not recall any U.S. personnel being present during his initial testing of the tank, nor does he mention any U.S. personnel in his post-operation report. Maj. Watkinson's report mentions only the Bomb Disposal Engineer with him at the school on this occasion.[22]

At the Kuwaiti Girls' School, Maj. Watkinson located the metal storage tank outside the perimeter walls of the school. Maj. Watkinson described the tank as having a capacity of approximately 2000 liters.[23] No one informed Maj. Watkinson or any other individual sent to the school of the earlier assessment by the safety officer that, based on the color and smell of the fumes, the tank may have contained nitric acid.

Dressed in full individual protective clothing (Figure 9), Maj. Watkinson conducted several tests of the fumes emitting from the tank. He used several chemical warfare agent detectors including a Chemical Agent Monitor (Figure 10), British one-color detector paper (Figure 11), and an M18A2 kit (Figure 12).[24] Following standard practice, he limited the number of persons in the contaminated area, so the Bomb Disposal Engineer maintained radio contact at a safe distance from the tank and fumes.[25]

Figure 9. Photograph of British NBC suit provided by UK Ministry of Defence

Figure 10. Photograph of Chemical Agent Monitor provided by UK Ministry of Defence

Figure 11. Photograph of British one-color detector paper provided by UK Ministry of Defence

Figure 12. Photograph of M18A2 chemical agent detector kit provided by UK Ministry of Defence

Maj. Watkinson first used the Chemical Agent Monitor to test the vapors. The CAM is a portable, hand-held instrument used to monitor the presence of nerve or blister agents.[26] Maj. Watkinson obtained a positive result for the presence of mustard agent when he used the CAM to test the vapors. It reflected eight bars, the highest possible reading for the presence of mustard agent. Maj. Watkinson did not know about a U.S. message dated Feb. 19, 1991, stating, "Fuming nitric acid will drive the CAM to eight bars on the mustard scale." This message originated following field tests where CAMs tested wreckage from a Scud missile that impacted near Hafir Al Batin, Saudi Arabia. The report warned operators that fuming nitric acid might cause the CAM to register a false positive for blister agent.[27]

After the CAM indicated the possible presence of mustard agent, Maj. Watkinson then tested the fumes with one-color detector paper. The paper produced no response. One-color detector paper is designed to analyze liquids, so we would not expect it to react when exposed to a vapor. Next, Maj. Watkinson extracted a small liquid sample from the tank by inserting a piece of wire through one of the bullet holes in the tank. He then wiped the wire on the one-color detector paper. If the liquid was a chemical warfare agent, the British one-color detector paper should have turned blue. However, the liquid turned the detector paper brown, a negative response for chemical warfare agent. The U.S. three-color detector paper also changes colors in the presence of chemical warfare agents: blister agent turns the paper red, G-series nerve agent turns the paper yellow, and V-series nerve agent produces a green color. When Maj. Watkinson tested the liquid on the three-color paper, the paper turned pink, which he believed signified a positive result for mustard agent.[28] Maj. Watkinson testified that "Both the one color and three color detector paper changed color, but the colors weren't entirely appropriate with the color that I would have expected. So, that was a positive result, but with question marks."[29]

The inconsistency in the test results using the CAM and detection papers led Maj. Watkinson to retest the tank's contents using an M18A2 chemical warfare agent detection kit. The M18A2 kit is a portable kit designed to test both liquid and vapors. Maj. Watkinson extracted vapors from the tank through glass tubes using a rubber bulb. He described the method he used with the M18A2 kit:

The M18A2 kit has glass tubes that contain sort of a cotton wool type substance, which is impregnated with certain chemicals. Obviously there are a whole series of different tubes, which are designed to detect for different agents. One can go through those tubes in sequence, in order to eliminate various chemicals and decide what it is you've got. I didn't go through that process fully, because I got a reading with the CAM and therefore I narrowed straight in on the H [mustard] agent.[30]

Maj. Watkinson tested the vapor six times using the M18A2 kit. In the presence of a chemical warfare agent, the kit shows distinctive color changes, specifically blue for mustard agent.[31] Four tubes changed colors to blue immediately; the remaining two tubes turned yellow initially, but turned blue some hours later.[32] Maj. Watkinson stated that, although the M18A2 detector kit produced a positive result, they were not as conclusive as he would have liked.[33]

1. Maj. Watkinson's Injury

While testing the sample extracted from the tank, Maj. Watkinson inadvertently came into contact with the liquid.

There was some of the liquid on the wire, which I then wiped onto the detector paper. I can only assume that in the process of doing that, I got some of the liquid onto the back of my thigh, and it went through my suit... It wasn't something that I was immediately aware of. In fact, it wasn't until I got back to the camp that evening that I noticed I'd been burnt. But it wasn't particularly painful; it was more a question of being uncomfortable.[34]

Maj. Watkinson noted that the burn on his thigh was just a red mark approximately 4 centimeters by 2.5 centimeters[35] and did not blister.[36] He received medical attention for the burn on Aug. 9, 1991, four days after he sustained the injury. According to the medical report, the burn did not blister but turned very red. The burn responded well to treatment with sulphadiazine cream[37] and completely healed within 7 to 10 days.[38] Maj. Watkinson provided the following statement about his injury:

The significance of the injury is...relevant, because I was dressed in all the full NBC [nuclear, biological, and chemical] protective equipment, and I at the time couldn't understand how I managed to get burned on a part of my body where there was no joint in the NBC clothing. The implication was that the chemical had gone through the NBC suit. This was a bit of a concern, because obviously our NBC suit was designed to protect us and clearly on this occasion it hadn't.[39]

Maj. Watkinson sealed both bullet holes with industrial silicone filler and plaster of paris bandages. He then checked the tank again for leaks using the CAM but found none.[40]

2. Maj. Watkinson's Initial Report

Despite conducting several tests using a CAM, an M18A2 kit, and one- and three-color detector paper, Major Watkinson was unable to identify with certainty the substance in the tank. The CAM and the M18A2 indicated the possible presence of mustard agent; the one-color detector paper turned brown denying presence of mustard agent, and the three-color detector paper changed colors but did not confirm mustard agent. Major Watkinson summarized the results of the initial test of the tank's contents as follows:

As far as I'm concerned, the CAM test was positive. It was eight bars on H. [mustard]. Both the one-color and three-color detector paper changed color, but the colors weren't entirely appropriate with the color that I would have expected. So, that was a positive result, but with question marks. The M18A2 detector kit gave test results, which again could have been interpreted as positive, but wasn't as conclusive as one would hope.[41]

Following his initial testing activities, Maj. Watkinson met with Kuwaiti and British military personnel, Col. John Macel, the Chief of the U.S. Office of Military Cooperation in Kuwait, and the chief of staff for U.S. Task Force Victory, Lt. Col. Donnie Killgore, to determine an appropriate course of action for disposition of the tank and its contents. The initial proposal was to transport the tank to an isolated location in the desert and destroy it. However, it was known that a United Nations chemical weapons evaluation team was in Iraq to inventory and assess Iraq's chemical weapons capability. The container would be useful to the United Nations efforts because if the container did contain chemical warfare agent, it would demonstrate Iraq's forward deployment of bulk chemical warfare agent. It was agreed to arrange for a UN team to take samples from the tank.[42]

At the same meeting, Lt. Col. Killgore suggested the Fox nuclear, biological and chemical reconnaissance vehicles assigned to the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment test the tank's contents. Although the CAM and other chemical detection kits indicated the possible presence of a chemical warfare agent, the Fox vehicle's MM-1 mobile mass spectrometer is able to identify 60 known chemical warfare agents by their molecular composition and weight of ions.[43] Lt. Col. Killgore believed the Fox vehicle could more accurately assess the presence of chemical warfare agent in the tank.[44]

After Maj. Watkinson reported the results of his initial field tests, the commander of the U.S. 146th EOD Detachment received information that raised doubts that the tank contained mustard agent when representatives of the Kuwaiti Ministry of Defence and various agencies conducting ordnance disposal discussed the possibility that the tank may contain a highly reactive industrial chemical. Also, the 146th EOD commander showed a picture of the tank to an Egyptian EOD officer, reportedly trained in Soviet rocketry. The Egyptian officer told the commander that the tank at the Kuwaiti Girls' School was the same type used by the Soviets to store rocket fuel, but this conclusion was not documented.[45] Colonel Macel stated that he never received an EOD incident report or other assessment to suggest the tank did not contain chemical warfare agent.[46] As a result, the individuals conducting tests of the tank's contents were not aware of the possibility that the tank may have contained either industrial chemicals or rocket fuel.[47]

The Headquarters, Task Force Victory,[48] tasked the U.S. 54th Chemical Troop to send two Fox vehicles to support the 21st EOD Squadron, British Royal Engineers, at the Kuwaiti Girls' School.[49] Maj. Watkinson commanded the joint operation since the school was in the British sector for ordnance disposal. Capt. Michael F. Johnson, commander of the U.S. 54th Chemical Troop, directed the Fox vehicle operations.[50] Together, they received a mission brief on the previous field test results from Col. Macel, who was then briefed on the Fox vehicle capabilities. This operation was the first joint U.S. and UK chemical warfare agent detection operation using the Fox vehicles, so American and British personnel conducted mission rehearsals to minimize any operational differences.[51]

U.S. and UK forces arrived at the tank site on Aug. 9, 1991.[52] UK forces consisted of Maj. Watkinson, a Bomb Disposal Officer, a Bomb Disposal Engineer, and additional British soldiers who formed a command post and decontamination team. U.S. forces included Capt. Johnson, two Fox vehicles and crew, a decontamination unit, Task Force Victory's Chief of Staff, Lt. Col. Donnie Killgore, and Col. John Macel. A medical team was also present in case of an emergency.

During this operation, only the Fox vehicle crewmembers, the Bomb Disposal Officer, and the Bomb Disposal Engineer proceeded beyond the hot line, a designated line that separated the active operations area from the decontamination area (Figures 13 and 14). All other soldiers observed the operation from the safety of the incident command post or ICP approximately 200 meters north-northeast (upwind) of the hot line. Incident command post personnel did not wear protective suits during this operation.[53]

Figure 13. Maj. Watkinson's sketch of UK and U.S. elements during the Fox testing.

Figure 14. Photograph of Fox vehicle testing taken by a U.S. Army officer in charge of decontamination operations, 54th Chemical Troop. (Reprinted by permission).

According to Maj. Watkinson, the Bomb Disposal Officer and the Bomb Disposal Engineer unsealed the bullet holes to extract liquid from the tank. Upon doing so, large quantities of vapor escaped from the holes for approximately two minutes before subsiding.[54] This suggested that the vapor pressure inside the tank had increased significantly since Maj. Watkinson sealed it two days earlier.

Using a long piece of rubber catheter tubing, the Bomb Disposal Officer and the Bomb Disposal Engineer extracted three liquid samples from the tank. The men transferred the samples into separate glass vials. They placed two vials in two separate brown glass bottles, one per bottle, in a steel ammunition box filled with fuller's earth, closed the ammunition box, and placed it next to the tank. They transferred the third sample to a stainless steel dish for Fox MM-1 analysis.[55] The liquid sample set aside for the MM-1 tests evaporated quickly. According to Maj. Watkinson,

One of the problems we were having was that the liquid, when put onto a stainless steel kidney tray, was evaporating quite quickly, and we hadn't anticipated this .… But nevertheless, mustard gas as I have dealt with it, seen it, and understand it, is fairly viscous, and I wouldn't have expected it to evaporate as quickly as it did. So, in my mind the rapid evaporation of the chemical was another indicator that suggested that this may not be mustard gas.[56]

While extracting the liquid from the tank, both the Bomb Disposal Officer and Bomb Disposal Engineer got some of the liquid on their rubber protective gloves. They noticed heat penetrating through their gloves and considered this a result of an exothermic chemical reaction-a release of heat due to contact between the liquid agent and the rubber gloves. The two men returned to the decontamination area and changed their gloves before continuing with the operation.[57]

Before the MM-1 tests began, the Fox crews severed communications between the two vehicles (vehicle C-23 and vehicle C-26) so as not to bias the test results.[58] Each crew maintained contact with Capt. Johnson. Because the third liquid sample evaporated, the Bomb Disposal Officer and Bomb Disposal Engineer extracted from the tank a fourth liquid sample and transferred it to the stainless steel dish.[59] Fox vehicle C-23 tested the sample first. C-23's MM-1 initially alerted to the possible presence of the choking agent phosgene. The MM-1 operator conducted another test-again the MM-1 initially alerted for the possible presence of phosgene.[60] The C-23 MM-1 operator then performed a spectrum analysis and printed the results to a hard copy tape for later analysis. With radio communications still disengaged, vehicle C-26 performed similar procedures. C-26's MM-1 initially alerted to the possible presence of phosgene as well as mustard agent. The C-26 MM-1 operator performed a spectrum analysis and printed the results. The hard copy tapes of the spectra results from both vehicles' MM-1s indicated the presence of an unknown substance (not phosgene or mustard).

After the Fox crews completed the MM-1 tests, the Bomb Disposal Officer and Bomb Disposal Engineer sealed the holes in the tank using luting, a quick drying putty, and plaster of paris strips. Once the plaster of paris hardened, they used a mixture of super tropical bleach and water to decontaminate the tank and the immediate area.[61]

An American sergeant first class, assigned to the 54th Chemical Troop, directed the Fox vehicle decontamination. He, along with the Bomb Disposal Officer, the Bomb Disposal Engineer, and the two British soldiers, formed the decontamination team.[62] The team, in protective garments, used CAMs to check the Fox vehicles for contamination, then proceeded to decontaminate the vehicles. The Bomb Disposal Officer and Bomb Disposal Engineer carried their equipment and the ammunition box to the emergency personnel decontamination station (EPDS) for decontamination. They sealed the box inside three large clear plastic bags with a label on the outer plastic bag. According to the Bomb Disposal Officer, they destroyed all the protective garments and other non-durable equipment used during the operation.[63]

While decontaminating the Bomb Disposal Officer and Bomb Disposal Engineer, the British lance corporal in charge of the EPDS felt a burning sensation on his right wrist. The lance corporal believed some of the liquid from the tank penetrated through his protective gear, so he decontaminated himself and removed his individual protective gear. The Bomb Disposal Officer described the circumstances of the injury sustained by the British lance corporal:

I was watching the EPDS party finishing the task from the CP [Command Post]. At the point when only the IC [lance corporal in charge] of the EPDS was left to decontaminate and undress himself he fainted (this I believe was due to the heat and the time spent in IPE [individual protective equipment]). Myself and another went to his assistance pouring vast quantities of water and decontaminant on his bare skin (arm), which was blistering. He was taken to a local … hospital [21st Squadron Medical Center]…[64]

In his report dated Jan. 4, 1994, Capt. Johnson stated that a British soldier (the British lance corporal) came into contact with a small amount of liquid from the tank while decontaminating the sampling team. The soldier reacted immediately, suggesting that the liquid penetrated the inner glove, suit and outer glove of his protective garments. According to Capt. Johnson, "within one minute, we observed that the soldier had a small blister forming on his wrist the size of a stick-pin head. Five minutes later, the blister reached the size of a (US) half-dollar coin"[65] (Figure 15). Capt. Johnson's report indicated that the British soldier went into shock almost immediately, presumably due to extreme pain. An on-site medical team treated the lance corporal for a 3-mm blister on his wrist and heat stress.[66]

Figure 15. Photograph of injured British soldier taken by the sampling team leader, Aug. 10, 1991

A doctor admitted the British lance corporal into the medical facility at Beteal Camp for one night. His medical report describes the injury and treatment he received:

The burn on his wrist was 0.5 x 1.0 cm in diameter, comprising an area of erythema with a centralized pinhead erupted zone. This injury is compatible with a variety of chemical or thermal insults ranging from contact with household disinfectants to perhaps more potent corrosive agents. The lesion did not propagate further, and responded quickly to silver sulphadiazine 1% (flamazine). The patient fully recovered from his heat exhaustion the following day and was fit to return to duty.[67]

Although the doctor said he had fully recovered, the lance corporal reported he did not return to duty until the following week. The lance corporal reported, "the scab on my right wrist took some two to three weeks to heal, but a red mark remained for three to four months." Furthermore, "no one came to debrief me about the operation and I was not told about the likely effects of my exposure to the agent in the tank. During my time there, no tests were taken to see if I had been exposed to mustard agent. I was told not to speak to anyone about the incident."[68] U.S. personnel who witnessed the events leading to the British lance corporal's injury reported that they received no information regarding his treatment or diagnosis.

Capt. Johnson provided the Fox MM-1 tapes to Lt. Col. Killgore, and all U.S. forces except the 54th Chemical Troop departed the area. The 54th Chemical Troop and the British 21st EOD Squadron guarded the tank and ammunition box to prevent any tampering with the samples in the ammunition box (Figure 16). The 54th Chemical Troop conducted its after-action review to recount events and evaluate operational procedures and equipment performance. Several hours later, military police from Task Force Victory arrived and took over the security detail of the tank and samples. The 54th Chemical Troop returned to Camp Doha where the results of the Fox vehicles' detection of chemical warfare agent were discussed with the regimental commander.[69]

Figure 16. 1991 Photograph of the ammunition box used to store samples from the tank, taken by sampling team leader on Aug. 10, 1991

After examining the Fox tapes, Lt. Col. Killgore decided that a laboratory with more sophisticated capabilities should analyze the Fox tapes. Upon his return to headquarters, he contacted the U.S. Army's Chemical Research, Development, and Engineering Center at Edgewood, Maryland. He faxed a copy of the Fox tapes and a description of the sampling and testing operations to CRDEC.[70] The Program Manager for NBC Defense Systems reportedly analyzed the Fox tapes;[71] however, we could locate neither the original fax from Lt. Col. Killgore nor the subsequent analysis of the tapes.

On Aug. 9, 1991, personnel at the United Nations Special Commission on Iraq in Bahrain were contacted by Maj. Watkinson and asked to inspect the tank at the Kuwaiti Girls' School.[72] In response, a British chemical weapons evaluation team arrived at the school to obtain samples from the tank.[73] The United Nations was not involved in the testing of the tank or taking any of the samples, and provided the following statement:

Although it is possible that the people involved in taking samples were at one time temporary UNSCOM inspectors, UNSCOM was not involved in the taking of samples from the tank at the Sabahiyah Girls' School in Kuwait. Chemicals in Kuwait are clearly not part of UNSCOM's purview, although UNSCOM does have interest in the contents of the tank as they probably originated from Iraq.[74]

On Aug.10, 1991, members of the sampling team met with British ordnance disposal personnel, Col. Macel, Lt. Col. Killgore, Maj. Watkinson, and a Kuwaiti army ordnance officer. Maj. Watkinson and Lt. Col. Killgore briefed the sampling team on earlier tests,[75] and provided the team with copies of the Fox tapes.[76] The sampling team interviewed key personnel, including Maj. Watkinson, the Bomb Disposal Officer, the Bomb Disposal Engineer, and the British lance corporal injured following the Fox vehicle tests.[77] The sampling team, accompanied by Col. Macel, Lt. Col. Killgore, Maj. Watkinson, and members of the 21st EOD Squadron, then traveled to the Kuwaiti Girls' School to collect the liquid samples from the tank.[78]

Upon arrival at the Kuwaiti Girls' School, the sampling team leader prepared the equipment needed for the operation. He labeled four tubes from a Sampling and Identification of Biological and Chemical Agents (SIBCA) kit in sequential order (Tab I). The tubes contained XAD-4 resin, a substance used by inspection teams to transport samples of chemical warfare agents.[79] The sampling team leader and another team member, along with Maj. Watkinson, put on full individual protective clothing before they approached the tank and ammunition box.[80]

The two sampling team members withdrew a sample from one of the bottles contained in the ammunition box using a glass syringe with a four-inch stainless steel internal tube. Then the sampling team selected one of the pre-prepared tubes containing XAD-4 resin at random and injected the sample into it through the rubber seal.[81] The first sample reacted violently when introduced into the tube, breaking both the tube and the syringe. The sampling team leader reported,

The original sample we were trying to take was onto an adsorbent, which is designed to take up chemical weapon agents. My theory, to which I still adhere, is that the nitric acid components reacted very quickly with the adsorbents and they gave off a gas, which just gave an enormous overpressure. So, the overpressure actually exploded the syringe.[82]

The violent reaction of the liquid sample on the XAD-4 resin caused doubts about the earlier assessment that the tank contained chemical warfare agent by the sampling team leader. The sampling team leader noted, "Chemical warfare agents in general are not actually very reactive chemicals. They have specific organic receptors on which they have their effect. So, they're not reactive. Our sampling kit was designed to deal with CW agents, which, as I say, are not reactive, whereas, this of course was obviously a very reactive chemical."[83] He later discussed the events at the school with colleagues in Bahrain, which further convinced him that the liquid in the tank most likely was fuming nitric acid.[84] The sampling team leader also reported:

My description of the liquid in the bottle was that it was of very low viscosity. Mustard is a very high viscosity liquid, similar to engine oil. On top of that, of course I had the descriptions of the injuries that [the British soldier] and Major Watkinson had suffered, and these were again inconsistent with mustard derived burns, but were wholly consistent with a powerful acid, such as nitric.[85]

When the tube broke during the sampling operation, a small amount of liquid agent possibly contaminated their protective gear. As a precaution, the sampling team conducted personal decontamination using hypochlorite solution and fuller's earth.[86] They withdrew from the contaminated area near the tank and went to the area established for personal decontamination. The team took a different approach the second time. Hoping to reduce the pressure in the tubes, they first removed the rubber seals from the screw top of the pre-prepared tubes and then placed a liquid sample onto the resin. The sampling team successfully deposited two samples in the tubes numbered 1 and 3.[87]

While observing the sampling team's activities, Maj. Watkinson noticed brown vapors once again escaping through the bullet holes in the tank. Once the sampling team completed its activities, Maj. Watkinson and the Bomb Disposal Engineer attempted to reseal the tank. Two members of the sampling team remained clothed in individual protective equipment to assist Maj. Watkinson. Maj. Watkinson removed the previous seals from the tank and used plaster of paris and chewing gum (no silicone sealant was available and the gum has similar properties to silicone sealant) to make new seals. After they resealed the tank, Maj. Watkinson, the Bomb Disposal Engineer, and the two sampling team members returned to the decontamination area.[88]

The sampling team sealed the liquid samples in suitable containers for transport (Figure 17) and established a chain of custody for control of the samples. The sampling team leader, Maj. Watkinson, and Col. Macel signed the seals on the containers to verify the samples were indeed those taken from the Kuwaiti Girls' School. The sampling team flew to Bahrain with the two tubes containing samples from the tank. The samples were treated as forensic evidence, so a signatory accompanied the samples at all times.[89] The sampling team relinquished custody of the samples to an individual from the UK Consulate to ship the samples to the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment, Porton Down, UK,[90] the laboratory responsible for analyzing samples of chemical warfare agents collected in Iraq.

Figure 17. Photo taken by sampling team leader on Aug. 10, 1991

The injuries sustained by Maj. Watkinson and the British lance corporal during the initial testing of the tank generated concern that the individual protective equipment would not provide adequate protection against a chemical warfare agent. Maj. Watkinson tasked the commanding officer of the 3rd Troop of the 21st EOD Squadron to conduct field tests on the individual protective equipment using the remaining liquid agent stored in the bottles in the ammunition box.[91] The field tests commenced on Aug. 14, 1991.

The commanding officer of the 3rd Troop conducted tests on the individual protective equipment using a piece of the suit material and cotton and inserting three-color detector paper between the various layers of the suit. Wearing full protective clothing, he and the Bomb Disposal Engineer removed the two remaining sample bottles from the ammunition box and found that the liquid sample had corroded the tops of the bottles. Only a small amount of liquid remained. The commanding officer placed a few drops on the suit material, and upon contact, the liquid burned through the outer fabric; within three minutes, the liquid penetrated through the charcoal layer. When the commanding officer examined the suit material, he found that the charcoal layer absorbed much of the liquid, but the inner cotton layer was also stained and slightly burned. Additionally, the three-color detector papers placed between the layers of material were red, suggesting the presence of a blister agent. Once the field tests concluded, Major Watkinson ordered the disposal of the remaining liquid in the ammunition box for security and safety reasons. Following the standard decontamination method for blister agent, the commanding officer poured the remaining liquid on the sand and mixed it with fuller's earth and bleach. He also burned the bottles that contained the liquid. During the testing on the individual protective equipment, a small amount of liquid spilled on the commanding officer's gloves. He noticed heat emanating from the contaminated area and replaced his gloves immediately.[92] The penetration of the liquid through the gloves raised more doubts on whether the tank contained mustard agent.

Members of the 21st EOD Squadron inspected the seals on the tank regularly for any leaks[93] and reported a leak on Aug. 12, 1991, assumed to be the result of the high temperature and the vapor pressure inside the tank.[94] According to Maj. Watkinson,

Although we'd done lots of testing, we still hadn't fulfilled our original mission, which was to stop the vapor coming out of the tank. The various seals [used] should have been fairly robust [in stopping chemical warfare agent leaks]. This again raised question marks. What appeared to be happening was that vapor pressure was building up inside the sealed container, which was pressurizing the seals and bursting them. I wouldn't have anticipated that this would occur with mustard gas, which is essentially not volatile and is quite oily. So, the chemical seemed to have quite a high vapor pressure, which was surprising.[95]

Maj. Watkinson ordered the commanding officer of the 3rd Troop of the 21st EOD Squadron, British Royal Engineers, to permanently seal the tank.[96] The commanding officer of the 3rd Troop, with assistance from the Bomb Disposal Engineer, removed the old seals and hammered in lead dowel plugs. These plugs were machine-tapered pieces of lead designed specifically to fit the two bullet holes in the tank.[97] Next, they inserted self-tapping screws then covered the seals with epoxy resin. Once the resin hardened, the commanding officer used a CAM and three-color detector paper to confirm there were no leaks around the seals. Once this was completed, the commanding officer of the 3rd Troop and the Bomb Disposal Engineer returned to the emergency personnel decontamination station.

The commanding officer decontaminated the reusable items and the piece of the individual protective equipment suit used in the field tests; however, we have been unable to locate the piece of material for further analysis. The 21st EOD Squadron continued to monitor the tank regularly for leaks.[98] Once the operation to seal the tank concluded, the commanding officer of the 3rd Troop wrote a final report and provided copies to the British personnel involved.

The sampling team transported the tubes containing the samples from Kuwait to Bahrain. The British Consulate staff intended for the samples to be flown from Bahrain to the United Kingdom by the British Royal Air Force. However, the Royal Air Force had ceased flight operations from Bahrain by the time the sampling team and the liquid samples arrived. The British Consulate staff arranged for the German authorities to transport the samples and authorized escorts to Munster, Germany. Upon arrival in Germany on Sept. 12, 1991, two individuals from the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment assumed custody of the samples.[99] They returned to Porton Down, United Kingdom, with the samples on Sept. 13, 1991, where the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment's analytical team reconfirmed the two samples (labeled 1 and 3, dated August 10, 1991) were those taken from the tank at the Kuwaiti Girls' School.[100]

The laboratory analysts at the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment prepared an initial report dated Sept. 24, 1991, concluding the samples were consistent with nitric acid. The samples had a definite yellow/brownish color compared to the original white of the resin. Extraction of the [XAD-4] resin with dichloromethane and analysis by gas chromatography/mass spectrometry showed no material of CW interest. Extraction of the resin from sample 1 showed 16 mg of nitrate and a pH of 2.2. Resin from sample 3 showed 35 mg of nitrate and a pH of 2.0. An extract of blank resin of similar weight contained less than 0.2 mg of nitrate and had a pH of 6.5. The samples were entirely consistent with the contents of the tank being nitric acid and there is no evidence of any CW dimension.[101] (See Tab J.)

In late September 1991, Maj. Watkinson received notification of the results of the laboratory analysis and the conclusion that the tank did not contain chemical warfare agent, but rather nitric acid. Maj. Watkinson notified Col. Macel at the U.S. Embassy in Kuwait, who then informed the U.S. military's Central Command, the Defense Reconstruction Assistance Office, the director of operations for the Kuwaiti military's general headquarters, and Task Force Victory of the laboratory results.[102] However, Lt. Col. Killgore and members of the 54th Chemical Troop had departed the Gulf region before the laboratory completed their tests and analysis on the samples, thus were not informed that the tank did not contain chemical warfare agents.[103]

Although the initial report prepared by Porton Down indicated that a detailed report would follow, no such detailed report was ever produced. This is probably because once it had been established that the tank's contents contained no chemical warfare agent, the matter assumed a low priority and the aim of producing a detailed report was overtaken by other, more pressing, commitments.

On Sept. 27, 1991, the Headquarters, British Forces Kuwait, notified the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment of their concern regarding the disposal or destruction of the tank. On Sept. 30, 1991, experts at the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment reported that because the tank may contain up to two thousand liters of nitric acid, it would be extremely difficult to dispose of safely. They also warned untrained personnel not to move the tank, nor dispose of its contents at its present location.[104] Scheduled to return to the United Kingdom on Oct. 2, 1991, the 21st EOD Squadron had already packed their equipment for shipping. As a result, they were unable to dispose of the tank and its contents before departing Kuwait. The Headquarters, British Forces Kuwait, needed to inform the Kuwaiti Army of the correct disposal procedures before the 21st EOD Squadron left Kuwait.[105] The tank was in good condition with the bullet holes effectively sealed. Therefore, experts at the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment suggested the Kuwait Ministry of Defence sell the tank to the local chemical industry or pay the chemical industry to remove the tank. Contemporary evidence suggests the Kuwait Ministry of Defence decided to let companies bid for a contract to dispose of the tank.[106]

Passive Barriers, Ltd., the British company that originally found the tank at the Kuwaiti Girls' School, notified Brown & Root on Oct. 29, 1991, that the tank contained fuming nitric acid.[107] An employee of Passive Barriers believed a British laboratory, in addition to the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment, received a separate sample for analysis.[108] However, the UK Ministry of Defence found no evidence to support the employee's supposition that multiple laboratories conducted analysis on samples from the tank. More likely, the Headquarters, British Forces Kuwait, provided the initial laboratory results indicating the tank's contents were consistent with nitric acid, to Passive Barriers.

On Oct. 30, 1991, the Brown & Root supervisor informed the Kuwaiti Emergency Recovery Office that the tank contained nitric acid, who then requested that Brown & Root provide disposal options and cost estimates. In the end, neither Brown & Root nor Passive Barriers actually disposed of the tank. A Passive Barriers employee suggested the Kuwaiti fire service transported the tank to an isolated location in the desert for destruction.[109] We cannot confirm the Kuwaiti fire service's involvement in the tank's disposal. Therefore, we cannot ascertain the final disposition of the tank and its contents.

1. 1994 Investigation by the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs

In January 1994, Capt.Johnson noted the absence of a formal report on the participation of the 54th Chemical Troop in the events at the Kuwaiti Girls' School. He stated, "he was concerned that it was possible that the history of my unit's chemical detection actions with the 21st EOD Squadron, British Royal Engineers, was not properly documented. I had not seen any official or unofficial record of those actions."[110] Captain Johnson drafted a report for training purposes at the US Army Infantry School, Fort Benning, Georgia. His report focused on lessons learned in nuclear, biological, and chemical defensive operations during the Gulf War. He also described in detail the Fox vehicle operations at the Kuwaiti Girls' School. The U.S. Army Infantry School reviewed and authorized Capt. Johnson's report for use in future course instruction.[111]

The same year, the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs began investigating allegations of chemical warfare agent use during the Gulf War. In Senate hearings held later that summer, the events at the Kuwaiti Girls' School became a focus of public attention. After reviewing Captain Johnson's report, Senate investigators focused on three key issues:

1. the validity of the tests;
2. the physical characteristics of the liquid in the tank; and
3. the injury sustained by the British lance corporal during the sampling operations.

The committee staff highlighted the fact that multiple tests of the tank's contents by multiple types of chemical detection equipment initially produced positive results for chemical warfare agent. The Senate committee reported a total of 21 separate tests on the liquid in the tank.[112] It appears the committee counted the Fox alarms and their corresponding MM-1 mobile mass spectrometer spectrum analyses as separate tests.

Table 1 illustrates the type and number of tests conducted at the Kuwaiti Girls' School in August 1991, their respective results, and comments on the results.

In testimony before the Senate committee, scientists from the U.S. Army Chemical Research, Development and Engineering Center confirmed the earlier laboratory assessment by the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment that the tank contained nitric acid. U.S. experts compared the mass spectrometer tapes to the mass spectrum of nitric acid, and the spectrum reportedly matched nitric acid in all four categories and in the correct proportions. However, this statement was incorrect; in truth, only a single peak, not three or four, would register for nitric acid on the Fox vehicle's MM-1. The American scientists assessed that the tank did not contain mustard agent or phosgene oxime.[118] The Fox MM-1 tapes (which we had not located at the time of the Senate investigation and the committee did not review) clearly show alarms only for mustard and phosgene agents, not phosgene oxime (Tab H).

U.S. DOD representatives provided the Senate committee inaccurate information on the laboratory procedures and test results of the liquid samples by the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Chemical/Biological Matters mistakenly reported that the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment analyzed pieces of the individual protective equipment worn by the injured British lance corporal.[119] In reality, the decontamination team burned the protective gear worn by the injured British lance corporal along with all other used individual protective equipment in accordance with standard procedures. Thus, the only tests of the tank's contents on the protective garments were those field tests conducted while on site at the Kuwaiti Girls' School.

In his report dated Jan. 4, 1994, Maj. (formerly Captain) Johnson stated that neither he nor any members of his unit had sufficient time to review the Fox tapes before relinquishing them to Lt. Col. Killgore.[120] Maj. Johnson stated he believed the tank most likely contained phosgene oxime, a blister agent, not phosgene, a choking agent, because of the severe burn and resulting blister sustained by the British lance corporal following the Fox vehicle tests.[121] In their final report, the committee accepted Maj. Johnson's theory and determined the British lance corporal's immediate reaction and burn due to contact with the liquid was consistent with exposure to phosgene oxime.[122] However, according to Lt. Col. Killgore, the tapes indicated the presence of phosgene and mustard, not phosgene oxime.[123]

DOD representatives strongly believed the tank did not contain chemical warfare agent, but rather inhibited red fuming nitric acid, but lacked the evidence to prove or disprove the initial test results. At the time of the Senate committee hearings, it appeared that there was no plausible explanation for the presence of inhibited red fuming nitric acid at the school, and the disposition of the tank was unknown. The DOD could not locate the original MM-1 mobile mass spectrometer tapes nor the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment's 1991 initial report on the laboratory analysis of the samples. The Senate committee maintained that chemical warfare agent was present in the tank.[124]

All evidence presented by the British and U.S. military contradicting the possible presence of chemical warfare agent in the tank was dated 1994, rather than 1991,[125] raising concerns of a biased analysis. However, both the Senate committee and the DOD were unaware that the release of official information in the UK is governed by the non-statutory Code of Practice.[126] Under these provisions, the British government is obliged to provide information on its policies, actions and decisions; however, there is no commitment to the disclosure of pre-existing documents. Consequently, the British responded to the DOD's requests for information using information from original documents, but copies of the originals were not provided. The UK provided documents dated 1994, but when compared to the source documents dated 1991, the text is virtually identical. Unaware of these guidelines in the UK policy of public disclosure of information, the DOD could not convince the Senate committee that chemical warfare agent was not present in the tank.

Finally, the Senate committee raised questions regarding awards issued by the Department of Defense to members of the 54th Chemical Troop for discovering chemical warfare agents in Kuwait. If a chemical warfare agent was not present at the Kuwaiti Girls' School, as indicated by the initial report prepared by the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment, then the DOD should not have made the awards. Reporters and authors suspicious of the Department's conclusions cited this apparent contradiction.[127]

2. 1997 Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans' Illnesses Investigation

In May 1997, President Clinton established the Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans' Illnesses to ensure an independent, open, and comprehensive examination of health concerns related to veterans service in the Gulf War. The Presidential Advisory Committee concluded the tank at the Kuwaiti Girls' School contained chemical warfare agent based on multiple positive detections reported by veterans and the lack of any contemporary analysis to the contrary.[128] In July 1997, officials from the UNSCOM testified before the Presidential Advisory Committee that inspections of Iraq's chemical weapons program produced no evidence that Iraq moved chemical weapons into Kuwait.[129] In September 1997, the DOD provided additional evidence that Iraq used the Kuwaiti Girls' School as a missile test and maintenance facility. The British also provided copies of the Fox tapes produced at the Kuwaiti Girls' School.[130] Despite the new evidence, the Presidential Advisory Committee did not amend its May 1997 conclusion that the tank contained a chemical warfare agent.

3. Public Attention in the United Kingdom

The UK press reported on the Senate committee investigation in October 1994. Articles in the British newspapers, Evening Standard and The Times, reported on the discovery of the tank and subsequent sampling operations at the Kuwaiti Girls' School. During the U.S. Senate investigation, Major Watkinson's initial report suggesting the liquid in the tank might be mustard agent was inappropriately released. The UK Ministry of Defence had not approved the public release of this document. The articles also quoted Maj. Johnson's testimony to the U.S. Senate committee on the Fox vehicle operations. He testified that the Fox vehicles initially alerted for mustard and phosgene oxime; in fact, the initial alerts were for mustard and phosgene. The British government responded to the press articles, stating that Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment analyzed the liquid samples and the results were consistent with the presence of nitric acid; there was no evidence of chemical warfare agents. However, on Nov. 12, 1995, The Mail on Sunday published an interview with a former British sergeant assigned to the 21st EOD Squadron during the Gulf War.[131] The sergeant served as the Bomb Disposal Engineer during operations to extract samples from the tank. He stated the tests at the Kuwaiti Girls' School indicated the presence of mustard agent. He questioned the letter to Parliament from the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment (CBDE) Porton Down, dated Jan. 25, 1995. He believed the letter asserted that CBDE Porton Down conducted laboratory tests on the injured British lance corporal's individual protective equipment. In fact, the letter simply referred to "damage to the NBC suit material" and stated that samples collected in Kuwait City were provided to CBDE Porton Down for analysis.[132] Anecdotal reports referenced damaged protective garments, but these reports referred to the field tests on the suit material conducted by the commanding officer of the 3rd Troop of the 21st EOD Squadron. The samples referred to in the CBDE Porton Down letter were the liquid samples deposited on XAD-4 resin.

The British press articles generated further concern by British members of Parliament regarding the presence of chemical warfare agent at the Kuwaiti Girls' School. The unresolved questions and confusion concerning the four separate testing operations prompted the DOD and the UK Ministry of Defence to conduct a joint review of the events related to the discovery, testing, and disposal of the tank. Investigators from the DOD Office of the Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, the British Gulf Veterans' Illnesses Unit, and analysts from the U.S. intelligence community worked together to address the issues of concern. Obtaining contemporary information about the testing and analysis of the liquid in the tank was a priority. In addition, it was important to determine whether the equipment used in the testing and sampling operations would register a false positive in the presence of a strong oxidizer such as inhibited red fuming nitric acid. Investigators interviewed thirty-one people who were involved directly with the discovery, testing, and disposal of the tank in 1991, at least 13 members of various UK government agencies and 15 members of various U.S. government agencies, the United Nations, representatives of the government of Kuwait and three non-governmental organizations.

1. 1997 Laboratory Analysis of Inhibited Red Fuming Nitric Acid

During the initial stages of this investigation in early 1997, we did not have the original Fox vehicle MM-1 tapes produced at the Kuwaiti Girls' School. Information printed on the Fox MM-1 tapes, specifically spectra data, would have been invaluable in attempts to identify the substance in the tank at the Kuwaiti Girls' School. However, since this information was unavailable, the U.S. Army Soldier and Biological Chemical Command, previously called the Chemical and Biological Defense Command, conducted laboratory tests to determine if inhibited red fuming nitric acid (IRFNA) could cause the MM-1 mobile mass spectrometer to false alarm. Unable to obtain a sample of the inhibited red fuming nitric acid used in Iraq's Seersucker/Silkworm missiles, scientists used laboratory-grade red fuming nitric acid in its place.[133] Red fuming nitric acid lacks an inhibitor (e.g., hydrogen fluoride or hydrogen iodine), which impedes corrosion of the container. During the laboratory tests, a MM-1 initially alerted for the nerve agent cyclosarin when exposed to laboratory-grade red fuming nitric acid.[134]

The Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans' Illnesses expressed concern regarding the disparity between these 1997 laboratory results and the results from 1991 tests at the Kuwaiti Girls' School.[135] At the Kuwaiti Girls' School in 1991, two Fox vehicle MM-1s alarmed for the possible presence of chemical warfare agents, mustard and phosgene, when they tested liquid samples from the tank. Nevertheless, the DOD concluded in 1997 the tank at the Kuwaiti Girls' School contained red fuming nitric acid. The project manager, NBC Defense Systems at the U.S. Army Chemical and Biological Defense Command, attributed the conflicting test results to the use of laboratory-grade red fuming nitric acid instead of the inhibited red fuming nitric acid believed to be in the tank. In addition, the possibility of a chemical warfare agent coexisting in the tank with red fuming nitric acid was viewed as extremely unlikely because red fuming nitric acid was used as a preferred decontaminating substance in mustard laboratory and production facilities before the Gulf War.[136] U.S. Central Intelligence Agency and DOD analysts also expressed concern the tank's contents were not pure due to contamination from the corrosive effects of inhibited red fuming nitric acid on the sampling tube or plunger used to take samples. Other environmental factors, such as the temperature and humidity, may have produced condensation in the tank, which would have altered the composition of the liquid contents in the tank. It is also possible that unknown contaminants entered the tank via the bullet holes. The tank's exposure to the environmental conditions and possible contaminants could not be duplicated in the 1997 laboratory tests, and may account for the variance between the MM-1's alerts for different substances than those represented on the Fox tapes from the 1991 operation at the Kuwaiti Girls' School. In addition, the tank's exposure to the environment could account for the increased pH level of the tank's contents. The pH level of nitric acid is approximately 1.0. However the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment's test results in 1991 showed pH levels of 2.0 and 2.2. It is known that nitric acid will absorb water vapor rapidly[137] and it is possible that changes in humidity and temperature in the tank over an unknown period could have altered the pH level of the tank's contents.

2. 1997 Analysis of the Fox MM-1 Tapes

During discussions with the UK Ministry of Defence in July 1997, we discussed our difficulty in locating the original Fox MM-1 tapes from the Kuwaiti Girls' School. We learned that the Ministry of Defence kept a copy of the MM-1 tapes (at the Chemical Biological Defence Establishment). The UK Ministry of Defence provided copies of the MM-1 tapes to our office and we resubmitted them to the U.S. Army Chemical and Biological Defense Command for analysis.

The MM-1 operator can print certain information about the chemicals displayed on the MM-1 screen (e.g., a list of ion masses and intensities) on a paper tape for record keeping and further analysis. Because every chemical has a characteristic combination of ions, known as a spectrum,[138] the MM-1 is able to identify chemicals by examining the spectrum. However, because the MM-1 makes initial detections using only a portion of a chemical's entire spectrum and looks for only a limited number of possible chemical warfare agents, it can sound false alarms for chemical warfare agents in the presence of similar ion patterns from other types of contaminating substances. Therefore, a second step in the analysis process is required to more definitively identify the sample where the entire library of known chemical warfare agents stored in the MM-1's memory is compared to the sample's spectrum.[139]

If a properly performed MM-1 spectrum analysis identifies a chemical warfare agent, the MM-1 operator and the Fox commander can be confident, although not assured, that the chemical warfare agent is present. Further analysis of the spectrum tape printout by a mass spectrometry expert, comparing the spectrum results to an established database of compounds, can increase the confidence level of the detection. Conversely, if the spectrum analysis does not identify one of the chemical warfare agents contained in the MM-1 library, the MM-1 operator and the Fox commander can be confident that any chemical warfare agent displayed during the initial alarm is not present. When the MM-1 cannot match any of the compounds stored in its library to the substance being analyzed, it indicates "unknown" on the operator's screen and the MM-1 tape printout.[140]

The MM-1 tapes from Fox vehicle C-23 (Figure 18) show that at 12:50 PM (August 9, 1991), the MM-1 alerted to the possible presence of the choking agent phosgene (CG). Following the initial alert for phosgene, the C-23 MM-1 operator initiated a spectrum analysis. The result, printed on the MM-1 tape at 12:51 PM, was "unknown"-this substance not only was not phosgene, it was not any substance in the MM-1 library. A second initial alert for phosgene (Figure 18) occurred at 13:22 (1:22 PM), followed by spectrum results of "unknown" at 13:23 (1:23 PM) and 13:25 (1:25 PM). The complete MM-1 tape (Tab H) also shows detailed spectrum results printed at 13:27 (1:27 PM), 13:29 (1:29 PM), and 13:30 (1:30 PM).

Figure 18. Sections of Fox Vehicle C-23's MM-1 tape

The MM-1 tapes from Fox vehicle C-26 (Figure 19) show spectrum results at 12:51 PM also indicating an unknown substance. The MM-1 operator printed the results to the MM-1 tape and used that information to program the unknown substance into the MM-1's memory; he named the substance "Extra Subst A1." From 12:53 p.m. to 1 p.m., C-26's MM-1 initially alerted to the possible presence of phosgene three times and to the extra substance A1 15 times. At 1:00 p.m. another spectrum analysis indicated "unknown." The MM-1 operator printed the results to the MM-1 tape and used those results to program this unknown substance into the MM-1's memory; he named this substance "Extra Subst A2." The complete C-26 MM-1 tapes (Tab H) show at 1:02 p.m. the MM-1 alerted to the possible presence of A1, A2, phosgene (CG), and S Mustard (HD)-a blister agent; from 1:03 p.m. to 1:39 p.m., initial alerts continued for various combinations of all of the above substances; however four additional spectra indicated A2 twice and unknown twice.

Figure 19. Sections of Fox C-26's MM-1 tape

A thorough understanding of the MM-1 and mass spectrometry is necessary to comprehend the MM-1 tapes, so experts at the U.S. Army's Chemical and Biological Defense Command (now known as the Soldier and Biological Chemical Command), the U.S. Department of Commerce National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), and Bruker Daltonics, the MM-1 manufacturer, analyzed the MM-1 tapes from both Fox vehicles at our request.

Bruker Daltonics provided the following assessment of the MM-1 tapes:

The tape shows that the system passed its automatic test on start-up indicating there were no major system failures. Approximately thirty minutes later, the system indicates an initial alarm that phosgene may be present.... Immediately, as called for to confirm the alarm in SOP [standard operating procedure], a spectrum is taken ... and the search of the 60 compound library indicates that the compound is unknown (not in the library of agents). Furthermore … the complete spectra in these tapes do not confirm the presence of CWA [chemical warfare agent]….[141]

In their analysis of the MM-1 tapes, NIST experts stated, "After examining the tapes from two Fox vehicles ... it is clear that there is no mass spectral evidence confirming the presence of either of the two CW agents reported (phosgene and HD)."[142]

The U.S. Army Chemical and Biological Defense Command's NBC defense systems project manager stated,

None of the initial warnings for either phosgene or mustard agent were verified by the MM-1 mass spectrometers located in either of the two Fox NBC reconnaissance vehicles that were at the site. Personnel followed … [a] scenario that included a second sample analysis and comparison to an internal library. In every retest, the MM-1 reported the spectrum analysis as "unknown." In the cases where the crew renamed this "unknown" as an 'extra substance' in the library, the MM-1 identified the spectra as that "extra substance."[143]

After examining the MM-1 tape spectra, all three of the expert agencies offered explanations regarding the initial alerts for the possible presence of the chemical warfare agents.

Bruker Daltonics noted:

[The MM-1] assign[ed] the unknown compound a concentration ... approximately 200 times as intense as the ions used to initially alarm for phosgene.... The most intense ion in the spectrum is mass 46 (100%).... For vehicle C-26, it appears from the spectrum at 12:51, that this system may have both hydrocarbon background and calibration compound. In this spectrum [mass] 69 is actually larger than the mass 46 (100% versus 62.3%).... At 13:01, mass 46 is now 100% ... the complete spectra in these tapes do not confirm the presence of CWA in the tank in question, but rather [are] consistent with the independent analysis that the brown oily liquid was in fact fuming nitric acid.[144]

In his analysis, the NBC defense systems project manager, wrote:

Ion mass 46 at 100% intensity was reported on every MM-1 tape, except one, and is identical to trials conducted at CBDCOM [Chemical/Biological Defense Command] using research grade red fuming nitric acid (RFNA).… The tapes from one of the Fox NBC reconnaissance vehicles indicate a mass 69 ion with 100% intensity. While this is a deviation from all other analyses that had mass 46 at 100%, it is easily explained. Coupled with the presence of other specific ions in significant amounts, this duplicates other known incidents of the fluorocarbon calibration gas escaping into the analysis system. Each of the three tapes from the MM-1 on this vehicle contains the presence of these peaks, indicating sample contamination with calibration gas. Subtraction of the calibration gas results in spectra which are similar to those of the other vehicle where ion mass 46 is the major component in the sample.[145]

Lastly, NIST experts stated, "the general finding that the largest peak is m/z 46, the principal peak in nitrogen dioxide, is consistent with the introduction of red fuming nitric acid into the mass spectrometers of both vehicles."[146]

The MM-1's inability to identify the presence of nitric acid (in any form) in the tank is because nitric acid or red fuming nitric acid, with or without an inhibitor, is not considered a chemical warfare agent. The MM-1s aboard Fox vehicles C-23 and C-26 did not identify nitric acid in the liquid samples because its library only contains the formulation of chemical warfare agents and nitric acid was not one of the chemical compounds stored in the libraries of either MM-1. Thus, following spectrum analyses, both vehicles' MM-1s indicated the spectrum results as unknown.

In summary, experts at the U.S. Army's Chemical and Biological Defense Command, the National Institute of Standards and Technology, and Bruker Daltonics carefully analyzed the MM-1 tapes from both Fox vehicles at the Kuwaiti Girls' School on Aug. 9, 1991. Their analyses are similar-all told us that despite initial alarms from Fox vehicles C-23 and C-26 for the possible presence of phosgene and HD mustard, the MM-1 spectra show that these chemical warfare agents were not present in samples from the tank at the Kuwaiti Girls' School. They all indicated that nitric acid, in some form, was partly responsible for the false alarms.

Attempts to identify the contents of the tank found at the Kuwaiti Girls' School proved difficult because of conflicting or contradictory indicators. Maj. Watkinson conducted numerous field tests on the vapors emitting from the tank and the liquid contents. Some were positive for mustard chemical warfare agent-the Chemical Agent Monitor produced an eight bar positive result for the presence of mustard and some of the M18A2 kit tests produced the signatory blue color change indicating mustard presence. However, the test with the one-color paper failed to identify a blister agent presence. The three-color paper tests and the remaining M18A2 tests were less definitive but implied a blister agent was there. The results were sufficient for Maj. Watkinson to suspect a possible presence of mustard agent. Further inspection of the tank and its contents by the Fox vehicles reinforced this perception among many participants who tested the tank because one vehicle's MM-1 mass spectrometers alerted to mustard agent and phosgene and the other alerted to phosgene. Although subsequent spectrum analyses by these same vehicles revealed the substance was not a chemical warfare agent but an unknown substance, the Foxes' initial alerts were best remembered.

In 1994, the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs investigated the events at the Kuwaiti Girls' School and highlighted the positive detections of chemical warfare agents by multiple chemical warfare agent detectors. Consequently, the Senate committee concluded that the tank contained chemical warfare agent. In 1997, the Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans' Illnesses concurred with the Senate committee's findings based on the multiple positive detections reported by veterans and the lack of contemporary evidence to the contrary.

However, despite these pronouncements and the initial results of the detectors, much more convincing evidence refutes a conclusion of a chemical warfare agent presence. Maj. Watkinson's initial test with one-color paper denied its presence. He also noted that the high vapor pressure in the tank, the speed with which the small sample evaporated from the testing pan, the low viscosity of the liquid, and the liquid's ability to quickly penetrate his individual protective clothing were uncharacteristic of a mustard agent. Rust-colored vapor is also abnormal for mustard. Additionally, the Army Corps of Engineers safety officer, unprotected by chemical protective clothing or mask, approached close enough to the tank to smell the contents and report the smell of nitric acid. That he experienced neither blister agent nor choking agent reactions supports the probability that the tank contained something other than these agents.

There were other indicators that the tank did not contain chemical warfare agents. The high volatility of the liquid as the soldiers attempted to capture samples resulted in the violent reaction with the XAD-4 resin causing the glass capture tube to shatter. The XAD-4 resin was designed for the capture of chemical warfare agents and the reaction was atypical. The liquid heated and melted the gloves of sampling team members. However, chemical protective gloves are made of butyl rubber impermeable to chemical warfare agents. The tests conducted by the commanding officer of the 3rd Troop, 21st Explosive Ordnance Disposal squadron on the individual protective clothing showed that the liquid burned through the material within three minutes-again, an uncharacteristic property of a chemical warfare agent. Finally, the liquid caused an immediate blister on the wrist of a British lance corporal. Neither mustard nor phosgene would cause such an injury so fast. Although phosgene oxime might cause such a response, phosgene oxime presence was speculation based on the end result (blisters), but other substances like nitric acid could have the same result. No evidence of phosgene oxime came to light in this investigation.

Although one Fox vehicle gave initial alerts for phosgene and mustard chemical warfare agents, and the other alerted to phosgene only, their more definitive spectrum analyses proved that those agents were not present. Instead they showed that a substance unknown to the Fox was present. In 1997, experts at the U.S. Army's Chemical and Biological Defense Command, the National Institute of Standards and Technology, and Bruker Daltonics, the manufacturer of the MM-1 mobile mass spectrometer, reviewed the Fox mass spectrometry tapes including full spectrums produced at the Kuwaiti Girls' School. All three experts concluded that chemical warfare agent was not present in the tank, and stated that nitric acid, in some form, was partly responsible for the initial alarms. Laboratory tests by the U.S. Army's Soldier Biological and Chemical Command revealed that laboratory-grade red fuming nitric acid will cause the MM-1 to false alarm for the presence of chemical warfare agent. Although the tests were unable to duplicate the alerts for phosgene and mustard, the experts concluded the difference was due to their inability to exactly replicate the liquid in the tank. In any case, the complete spectra on the tapes indicate the Fox vehicles detected a nitric acid compound, not a chemical warfare agent.

Finally, the evidence that weighs most heavily in our assessment is the contemporaneous testing of samples of the contents of the tank at the Kuwaiti Girls' School. These samples, taken under standard procedures by trained personnel, transported under chain-of-custody control, and evaluated by the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment, Porton Down, a laboratory designated by UNSCOM for expert chemical warfare agent analyses, showed no evidence of any chemical warfare agent. Instead, the 1991 report results showed that laboratory analysis of the samples was entirely consistent with the contents of the tank being nitric acid. Furthermore, since the chemical properties of nitric acid would not allow a chemical warfare agent to coexist in the tank, chemical warfare agent was not present.

In our 1998 report we initially believed that IRFNA was definitely present in the tank. However, because the laboratory did not conduct additional tests to determine other possible substances or contaminants in the tank, we cannot be certain of the nature of the nitric acid. Witnesses reported rust-colored vapors emitting from the bullet holes in the tank, which implies the substance may have been a red fuming nitric acid. We also believe an inhibitor was in the tank because witnesses did not report any evidence of corrosion of the tank.

The physical evidence, the Fox mobile mass spectrometry tapes, and the laboratory analysis of the liquid samples provide more compelling and more corroborating arguments than do the initial detector alerts. Furthermore, we conclude that the tank definitely contained a form of nitric acid, most likely inhibited red fuming nitric acid. Consequently, we assess the liquid in the tank at the Kuwaiti Girls' School was definitely not a chemical warfare agent.

All personnel involved in the testing of the tank at the Kuwaiti Girls' School performed their duties in an exemplary manner. UK and US forces completed proper planning and coordination; used all field equipment properly; employed proper technical resources; and, following proper NATO procedures, took samples and transported them for laboratory analysis in accordance with standard procedures.

The equipment used by the UK and US forces operated as designed. The Fox did not have a spectrum for nitric acid in its library, and thus could not positively identify the substance as such. It is the policy of both the UK and US militaries to set chemical weapons detector parameters so as to operate on the side of caution, i.e., to accept a false positive response, rather than run the risk that a genuine chemical warfare agent might be overlooked. From the safety perspective, it is preferable to have a small number of false positives, which cause soldiers to take additional protective measures, rather than risk injury to personnel. This incident was clearly a case in point. While nitric acid is not a chemical warfare agent, it poses a serious health hazard to anyone in contact with it. A description of inhibited red fuming nitric acid, which we believe was in the tank, and its related health hazards is at Tab D.

Several key factors prevented a rapid inquiry and assessment of these events. The sensitive nature of the testing limited distribution of pertinent information. This meant that some individuals ended their involvement with limited information and unanswered questions about the nature of the tank's contents. A summary of individuals' knowledge regarding the Kuwaiti Girls' School is at Tab F. The numerous and varied groups having contact with the tank further hindered investigations, until we determined the relationship of the various operations. Finally, inconsistencies in reporting made an early assessment impossible. We interviewed some individuals several times and re-analyzed documents until we developed a more complete picture of events at the school from March 1991 until November 1991. A breakout of events and those involved is at Tab G. The key lessons learned by the US DoD from this investigation are at Tab K.

BW biological warfare

BDO Bomb Disposal Officer

CAM Chemical Agent Monitor

CBDCOM Chemical/Biological Defense Command

CBDE Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment

CG phosgene

CRDEC Chemical Research, Development and Engineering Center

CW chemical warfare

CWA chemical warfare agent

DOD Department of Defense

DRAO Defense Reconstruction Assistance Office 

EOD explosive ordnance disposal

EPDS Emergency Personnel Decontamination Station

H mustard

HD sulfur mustard

ICP incident command post

IPE individual protection equipment

IRFNA inhibited red fuming nitric acid

KERO Kuwaiti Emergency Recovery Office 

MoD Ministry of Defense

mg milligrams

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NBC nuclear, biological, and chemical

NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology

ppm parts per million

RII report of initial information

RFNA red fuming acid

SIBCA sampling and identification of biological and chemical agents

STEL short term exposure limit

SOP standard operating procedure 

UK United Kingdom

UN United Nations

UNSCOM United Nations Special Commission

U.S. United States

UTM Universal Transverse Mercator Grid

AC

A blood agent. Chemical Name: Hydrogen cyanide[147]

Blister agent

A blister agent is a chemical warfare agent that produces local irritation and damage to the skin and mucous membranes, pain and injury to the eyes, reddening and blistering of the skin, and when inhaled, damage to the respiratory tract. Blister agents include mustards (HD, HN, HQ, HT, and Q), arsenicals like lewisite (L), and mustard and lewisite mixtures (HL). Blister agents are also called vesicants or vesicant agents.[148 , 149]

Blood agent

A blood agent is a chemical warfare agent that is inhaled and absorbed into the blood, carrying the agent to all body tissues where it interferes with the tissue oxygenation process. The brain is especially affected. The effect on the brain leads to cessation of respiration followed by cardiovascular collapse. Examples of blood agents are AC and CK.[150]

Chemical Agent Monitor (CAM)

A CAM is a hand-held, soldier-operated device that is used to monitor chemical warfare agent contamination on soldiers and equipment. The CAM may give false readings when used in enclosed spaces or when sampling near strong vapor sources (e.g., in dense smoke). Some vapors known to give false readings are aromatic vapors (perfumes, food flavorings, some aftershaves, peppermints, cough lozenges, and menthol cigarettes when vapors are exhaled directly into the nozzle), cleaning compounds (disinfectants, methyl salicylate, menthol), smokes and fumes (exhaust from some rocket motors, fumes from some munitions), and some wood preservative treatments (polychlorinated biphenyls or PCBs).[151]

Chemical and Biological Defense Command (CBDCOM)

CBDCOM was a US Army command with a mission to provide research, development, and acquisition for nuclear, biological, chemical (NBC), and obscurant equipment for the US Forces: to act as the Army NBC defense commodity command; to provide management of joint service NBC defense material; to provide US chemical stockpile management and safe storage; to provide installation management; to prepare for and respond to chemical biological emergency events/accidents; provide weapons of mass destruction (chemical or biological) domestic preparedness support; to conduct emergency remediation/restoration actions at chemical sites; to provide successful planning, management, and execution of treaty responsibilities; and to provide demilitarization support. The Chemical and Biological Defense Command merged with the Soldier Support Command to form the Soldier and Biological Chemical Command.[152]

Chemical warfare agent (CWA)

A chemical warfare agent is a chemical substance used in military operations to kill, seriously injure, or incapacitate through its physiological effects. Excluded are riot control agents, herbicides, smoke, and flame. Included are blood, nerve, blister, choking, and incapacitating agents.[153]

Chromatography

A process in which a chemical mixture carried by a liquid or gas is separated into its individual components.[154]

CK

A blood agent. Chemical Name: Cyanogen chloride[155]

Contaminant

A substance that, when present in the absence of a chemical warfare agent or the presence of chemical agent at the blank level causes a false positive when otherwise a true negative would have resulted[156]

CX

Phosgene oxime (see urticant and blister agent) Chemical Name: Dichloroformoxime[157]

Cyclosarin

A nerve agent known as GF. Chemical Name: O-Cyclohexyl-methylfluorophosphonate[158]

Detection Paper

Detection paper works because certain dyes are soluble in chemical warfare agents. Normally, two dyes and one pH indicator are mixed with cellulose fibers in a paper without special coloring (unbleached). When the paper absorbs a drop of chemical warfare agent, it dissolves one of the pigments. Mustard agent dissolves a red dye and nerve agent a yellow dye. In addition, VX nerve agent causes the indicator to turn to blue—which, together with the yellow, will become green or green-black. Detection paper can thus be used to distinguish between three different types of chemical warfare agents. A disadvantage with the papers is that many other substances can also dissolve the pigments. Consequently, detection papers should not be located in places where drops of solvent, fat, oil, or fuel can fall on them. Drops of water cause no reaction.[159]

Distilled Mustard

A blister agent known as HD. Chemical name: Bis-(2-chloroethyl) sulfide[160]

Dyspnea

Difficult or labored respiration.[161]

Enzyme

Any of the numerous complex proteins that are produced by living cells and catalyze specific biochemical reactions at body temperatures.[162]

Erythema

Abnormal redness of the skin due to capillary congestion.[163]

Explosive ordnance disposal (EOD)

The detection, identification, on-site evaluation, rendering safe, recovery, and final disposal of unexploded explosive ordnance. It may also include removal of explosive ordnance that has become hazardous by damage or deterioration.[164]

Flamazine

Also known as silver sulfadiazine. A sulfa medicine used to prevent bacterial or fungus infections. It works by killing the fungus or bacteria. It is applied to the skin.[165]

Fox Nuclear, Biological, Chemical (NBC) Reconnaissance System

The Fox is a six-wheeled, light armored vehicle designed primarily for reconnaissance of liquid chemical warfare agent hazards. On-board chemical warfare agent detection capabilities include the MM-1 mobile mass spectrometer, which is the primary detection device, the M43A1 chemical agent detector, which is an integral component of the M8 alarm system, and the M256A1 chemical agent detector kit. The Fox is also equipped with two radiation detectors. The Fox does not provide any biological warfare agent detection capability, but it does protect the crew from biological hazards, and it allows the crew to mark areas of potential hazard and safely take samples for laboratories to analyze for biological hazards.[166]

Fuller's Earth

An earthy substance that consists chiefly of clay mineral but lacks plasticity and that is used as an adsorbent, as filter medium and a carrier for catalysts.[167]

GA

A G-series nerve agent known as tabun. Chemical name: Ethyl N,N-dimethylphosphoroamidocyanidate[168]

GB

A G-series nerve agent known as sarin. Chemical name: Isopropyl methyl phosphonofluoridate[169]

GD

A G-series nerve agent known as Soman. Chemical name: Pinacolyl methyl phosphonofluoridate[170]

GF

A G-series nerve agent known as cyclosarin. Chemical Name: O-Cyclohexyl-methylfluorophosphonate[171]

G-series nerve agent

G-series nerve agents are lethal chemical warfare agents that work by inhibiting the proper functioning of the cholinesterase enzymes needed for the transmission of nerve impulses throughout the body. These agents affect the functioning of all bodily systems, including the eyes, nose, throat, lungs, and muscles. The G-series nerve agents include tabun (GA), sarin (GB), soman (GD), and cyclosarin (GF). The normal sequence of symptoms is a running nose, tightness of the chest, dimness of vision and pinpointing of the eye pupils, difficulty breathing, drooling and excessive sweating, nausea, vomiting, cramps, involuntary defecation and urination, twitching, jerking and staggering, headache, confusion, drowsiness, and coma. Cessation of breathing and death follow.[172]

GulfLink

A World Wide Web site maintained by the Office of the Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness) for Gulf War Illnesses, Medical Readiness, and Military Deployments (www.gulflink.health.mil).

HD

A blister agent known as distilled mustard. Chemical name: Bis-(2-chloroethyl) sulfide[173]

HL

A blister agent known as mustard—lewisite. Chemical names: HD: Bis-(2-chloroethyl) sulfide L: Dichloro-(2-chlorovinyl)arsine[174]

HN (-1, -2, & -3)

A blister agent known as nitrogen mustard. Chemical names: HN-1: Bis-(2-chloroethyl) ethylamine. HN-2: Bis-(2-chloroethyl)methylamine. HN-3: Tris-(2-chloroethyl) amine[175]

HQ

A blister agent known as sulfur-mustard/sesqui-mustard. Chemical names: HD: Bis-(2-chloroethyl) sulfide. Q: 1,2-Bis (2-chloroethylthio) ethane[176]

H-series blister agents

A series of persistent blister agents that includes levinstein (sulfur) mustards (H), distilled mustard (HD), nitrogen mustards (HN), a mustard-lewisite mixture (HL), a mustard T mixture (HT), a sulfur-mustard/sesqui-mustard mixture (HQ), and sesqui-mustard (Q).[177] , [178]

HT

A blister agent known as mustard-t mixture. Chemical name: HD: Bis-(2-chloroethyl) sulfide T: Bis [2(2-chloroethylthio) ethyl] ether[179]

Hydrocarbon

A hydrocarbon is an organic compound containing only carbon and hydrogen and often occurring in petroleum, natural gas, coal, and bitumens.[180]

Incapacitating agent

An incapacitating agent is a chemical warfare agent that produces a temporary disabling condition (physiological or psychological) that persists for hours to days after exposure has ceased.[181]

L

A blister agent known as lewisite. Chemical Name: Dichloro-(2-chlorovinyl)arsine[182]

Lute

To seal or cover (as a joint or surface) with lute. [183]

M18/M18A2 Chemical Agent Detector Kit

The M18 and improved M18A2 kits are portable, expendable items capable of surface and vapor analyses. The M18A2 kit is designed primarily for detecting dangerous concentrations of vapors, aerosols, and liquid droplets of chemical agents. Distinctive color changes indicate the presence of a chemical warfare agent.[184]

M19 Sampling and Analyzing Kit

The M19 kit is a portable, expendable item used to identify chemical agents, perform the preliminary processing of unidentifiable chemical or biological warfare agent samples, and delineate contaminated areas.[185]

M256 chemical warfare agent detector kit

In the field, the M256-series chemical warfare agent detector kit is simply referred to as the M256 kit. The M256 kit is a portable, expendable item capable of detecting and identifying hazardous concentrations of blister, blood, and nerve agents. The M256 kit is used after a chemical warfare agent warning to test for and confirm the presence and type of chemical warfare agent, and to determine if it is safe to unmask. The M256A1 kit has replaced the M256 kit. The only difference between the two kits is that the M256A1 kit will detect lower levels of nerve agent. US forces used both the M256 kit and the M256A1 kit during the Gulf War.

Some smokes, high temperatures, standard US decontamination solution number two (DS2), and petroleum products may cause false readings. Results may be inaccurate when sampling is performed in smoke from burning debris.[186]

M81A chemical alarm

The M8A1 is an automatic chemical agent detection and warning system designed to detect the presence of nerve agent vapors or inhalable aerosols. The M8A1 will automatically signal the presence of the nerve agent in the air with both an audible and visual warning. The US military fielded the M8A1 to replace the wet chemical M8 detector—which eliminated the M229 refill kit, the logistic burden, and associated costs. The M8A1 operates in a fixed, portable, or vehicle mounted configuration.[187]

Mission Oriented Protective Posture (MOPP)

Mission oriented protective posture (MOPP) is a flexible system used to direct the wearing of chemical protective garments and mask—a system that balances mission requirements with the chemical warfare agent threat. Wearing chemical protective garments and mask provides soldiers protection against most known chemical warfare agents, biological agents, and toxins.

At MOPP Level 0 soldiers carry their protective mask while their remaining MOPP gear must be readily available (e.g., within the work area, fighting position, living space, etc.) At MOPP Level 1, soldiers wear their overgarment and carry the rest of their MOPP gear. At MOPP Level 2, soldiers wear their overgarment and overboots while carrying the mask with hood and gloves. At MOPP Level 3, soldiers wear their overgarment, overboots, and mask with hood, but not the gloves. At MOPP Level 4, soldiers wear all their MOPP gear.[188]Commanders can raise or lower the amount of protection through five levels of MOPP. In addition, commanders, under certain situations, can exercise a mask-only option.[189]

MM-1 mobile mass spectrometer

The MM-1 mobile mass spectrometer is the primary chemical warfare agent detector in the Fox reconnaissance vehicle. During Operation Desert Storm, the MM-1 monitored against a target list of approximately ten selected chemical warfare agents most likely to be present, based on intelligence reports of the suspected chemical warfare agent threat. To speed the initial search, the sampling probe operates at 180� C and the MM-1 looks for only four ion peaks of each detected chemical warfare agent and attempts to match the target list of chemicals against the pattern and ratio of these peaks. If an initial match is made with these four ion peaks at a pre-determined intensity and relationship, the MM-1 sounds an alarm. However, this first alarm does not confirm the presence of a chemical warfare agent, since there are many chemicals that have similar ion peaks and many combinations of chemicals that may yield ion patterns similar to those in the target list. Consequently, the MM-1 can falsely indicate the presence of dangerous chemical warfare agents. To more conclusively determine what chemical is present, the operator must lower the sampling probe temperature to 120� C, re-acquire a sample of the suspected substance, and run a spectrum analysis with the MM-1 against all the detection algorithms stored in the MM-1 chemical library. For more detailed analysis later, the complete ion spectrum of the suspected sample can be printed on a paper tape.[190]

Mustard

A group of agents that includes the sulfur mustards (H and HD) which are chlorinated thioethers, and the nitrogen mustards (HN-1, HN-2 and HN-3) which are considered derivatives of ammonia. Mustards can penetrate skin and a great number of materials. These materials include wood, leather, rubber and paints. Because of their physical properties, mustards are very persistent under cold temperature conditions. [191]

m/z

m/z represents mass-to-charge ratio. A mass spectrum (e.g., what is seen on the MM-1 screen) represents the detection of ion fragments with a specific m/z. Each vertical line on the X-axis represents a fragment of a particular mass to charge ratio. The intensity of the lines (measured along the Y-axis) represents the count (the number of fragments detected with that ratio).[192]

Nerve agents

Nerve agents are highly toxic and among the deadliest of chemical warfare agents. Nerve agents may be absorbed through any body surface; the skin, eyes, and respiratory tract, and through the gastrointestinal tract when ingested with food or water. They affect the nervous and the respiratory systems and various body functions. Nerve agents include the G-series and V-series chemical warfare agents such as G-agents Tabun (GA), Sarin (GB), Soman (GD), and GF. A V-agent is VX. Detailed descriptions of nerve agents are found in US Army Field Manual 3-9.[193]

pH

A chemistry measurement of acidity and alkalinity, the pH scale ranges from 0 to14, with 7 as the neutral point. A substance with a pH lower than 7 is acidic, while a pH above 7 is alkaline.[194]

Pulmonary Edema

Abnormal accumulation of fluid in the lungs.[195]

Q

A blister agent, known as sesqui-mustard, Q is a more effective chemical warfare vesicant than sulfur mustard (H). It produces symptoms consistent with blister type agents, with about five times stronger skin activity than distilled mustard (HD). The fact that it is in solid form at room temperature with a very low vapor pressure hinders its effective use as a chemical warfare agent. Combining sesqui-mustard (Q) with distilled mustard (HD) to form sulfur-mustard/sesqui-mustard (HQ) helped to eliminate this problem. Chemical name: Ethylene bis (2-Chloroethyl) sulfide, or 1,2-Bis (2-chloroethylthio) ethane[196]

Riot control agent

A riot control agent is a chemical that produces transient effects that disappear within minutes after exposure and rarely require medical treatment. Riot control agents are effective in quelling civil disturbances and in some military operations, in preventing unnecessary loss of life.[197]

Sarin

A nerve agent known as GB. Chemical name: Isoproyl methylphosphonofluoridate[198]

Soldier and Biological Chemical Command (SBCCOM)

Headquartered at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, SBCCOM has a broad research, development and acquisition mission to ensure the decisive edge and maximum protection for the United States. SBCCOM develops, acquires, and sustains soldier, soldier support, and nuclear, biological, and chemical defense technology, systems, and services. SBCCOM also provides for safe storage, treaty compliance, and destruction of chemical materiel.[199]

Soman

A nerve agent known as GD. Chemical name: Pinacolyl methyl phosphonofluoridate[200]

Tabun

A nerve agent known as GA. Chemical name: Ethyl N, N-dimethylphosphoroamidocyanidate[201]

Task force

A temporary grouping of units, under one commander, formed to carry out a specific operation or mission; a semi-permanent organization of units, under one commander, formed to carry out a continuing specific task; or a component of a fleet organized by the commander of a task fleet or higher authority to accomplish a specific task or tasks.[202]

Universal Transverse Mercator Grid (UTM)

UTM is a coordinate system used for creating maps. The UTM system projects a series of intersecting grid lines on the Earth's surface, extending from 84 degrees north to 80 degrees south latitudes. Also called UTM Grid.[203]

Urticant

A substance that causes a burning or itching of the skin such as that caused by nettle stings.[204]

V-series agents

V-series agents are persistent, highly toxic nerve agents developed in the mid-1950s and absorbed primarily through the skin. V-series agents are generally odorless liquids which do not evaporate rapidly. The standard V agent is VX.[205]

Vesicant

Agent that acts on the eyes and lungs, capable of producing blisters, and blisters the skin[206]

VX

V-series nerve agent. Chemical Name: O-ethyl-S-(2-diisopropylaminoethyl)methyl phosphonothiolate[207]

Brletich, Nancy R., Mary Jo Waters, Gregory W. Bowen, Mary Frances Tracy, Worldwide Chemical Detection Equipment Handbook, Chemical and Biological Defense Information Analysis Center, October 1995. Copies of the Worldwide Chemical Detection Equipment Handbook may be purchased from the CBIAC. To order, please contact the CBIAC Administrator, via phone (410-676-9030), fax (410-676-9703), e-mail ([email protected]), or use the interactive request form on the CBIAC web site www.cbiac.apgea.army.mil (as of Oct. 19, 1999).

Cooper, Dale B., "Drumbeat of Denial," Soldier of Fortune, May 1997.

Chemical Propulsion Information Agency, "Liquid Propellants" Hazards of Chemical Rockets and Propellants, Vol. III, September 1984.

CW Procedural Text for Chemical Corps Field Laboratories, Book 1, Part I, Chemistry of CW Agents, Chemical Corps, Chemical and Radiological Laboratories, Army Chemical Center, MD, Jan. 7, 1954.

Dettmer, Jamie, "Chemical Weapons Used in Gulf War," Evening Standard, Oct. 13, 1994.

Eddington, Patrick G., Gassed in the Gulf, Washington, DC: Insignia Publishing Company, 1997.

Evans, Michael, "Allies Found Iraq Stored Blister Agent in Kuwait," The Times, Oct. 14, 1994.

Federation of American Scientists, Washington DC, web site www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/missile/row (as of Jan. 25, 2001).

Fox tapes produced at the Kuwaiti Girls' School, Aug. 9, 1991.

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Initial Report from commanding officer, 21st EOD Squadron, Subject: "Suspected Chemical Container," Aug. 7, 1991.

Initial report from sampling team leader, Subject: "Sampling and Assessment of Suspected Chemical Container," Aug. 11, 1991.

Interview with Colonel John Macel, Oct. 16, 1997.

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Interview with sampling team leader, Oct. 9, 1997.

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Lead sheet 6025, Interview with commander of the 146th Explosive Ordnance Disposal Detachment, Sept. 15, 1997.

Lead sheet 6430, Interview with senior US EOD officer in theater, Oct. 15, 1997.

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Lead sheet 7005, Interview with Major General Patrick Kelly, USA (Ret.), Nov. 13, 1997.

Lead sheet 7213, Interview with safety officer, US Army Corps of Engineers, July 10, 1997.

Lead sheet 23181, Meeting with Fox subject matter experts, Aug. 26, 1999.

Letter from Assistant Secretary of Defense for Chemical/Biological Matters, No Subject, undated

Letter from Brown & Root International, Inc. to contracting officer, Kuwaiti Emergency Response Office, Subject: "Oxident Disposal at School," Oct. 30, 1991.

Letter from Bruker Daltonics, Subject: "Analysis of Fox Tapes," Dec. 15, 1997.

Letter from National Institute of Standards and Technology, No Subject, Dec.19, 1997.

Letter from Passive Barriers Ltd. employee, Subject: "Container at Sabahiyah Girls School," Feb.10, 1998.

Letter from Passive Barriers, Ltd. employee, Subject: "Schools Search and Disposals Certificate," Aug. 24, 1991.

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Memorandum from Battelle, Subject: "Chemical Properties of Fuming Nitric Acid," March 18, 1998..

Memorandum from Captain Michael F. Johnson to director, Combined Arms Training Directorate, Subject: "Iraqi Chemical Agents - Information Paper," Jan. 4, 1994.

Memorandum from Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment (UK), Subject: "Collection of Samples taken from Kuwaiti Girls High School," Dec. 8, 1997.

Memorandum from Department of the Army, Chemical and Biological Defense Command, Subject: "Testing Response of Chemical Agent Detection Equipment to Red Fuming Nitric Acid," April 11, 1997.

Memorandum from Department of the Army, Office of the Project Manager for NBC Defense Systems, No Subject, Sept. 11, 1997.

Memorandum to commander, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, Subject: "Tasking Number 91-047," Aug. 7, 1991..

Memorandum from Lieutenant Colonel Donnie Killgore to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Chemical Biological Matters, Subject: "Suspect Chemical Container Found in Kuwait City, Kuwait in August 1991," July 29, 1994.

Memorandum from Persian Gulf War Illnesses Task Force to the Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, Subject: "Cleared Statement by UNSCOM on Kuwait Girl's School Tank," Jan. 22, 1998.

Memorandum from UK Ministry of Defence, Subject: "Clarification of the Sampling team Leader's Previous Testimony," Dec. 17, 1997.

Memorandum for record by lead analyst regarding captured missiles at Kuwaiti Girls' School, Office of the Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, No Subject, Oct. 21, 1997

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Message from Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment, Porton Down, Subject: "Disposal of Tank of Nitric Acid in Kuwait," 301530Z September 1991.

Message RII-1488 from Defense Intelligence Agency, Subject: "Mating Chem Warheads to Frogs/Silkworms," No date.

Message from Headquarters, British Forces, Kuwait, Subject: "Disposal of Tank of Nitric Acid in Kuwait," PR271100Z September 1991.

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Statement of troop commander of 1st Troop, 21st EOD Squadron, Subject: "Chemical Incident Sabahiyah Girls School, Kuwait 1991," Nov. 10, 1997.

Subsequent Report from commanding officer, 21st EOD Squadron, Subject: "Chemical Exploitation Report," Aug. 18, 1991.

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The U.S. DOD requires a common framework for our investigations and assessments of chemical warfare agent reports, so we turned to the UN and the international community, which had chemical weapons experience (e.g., the UN's investigation of the chemical weapons used during the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war). Because the modern battlefield is complex, the international community developed investigative and validation procedures[208] to provide objective information about possible chemical weapons incidents. Based on these international procedures and guidelines, our methodology includes these factors:

• A detailed written record of the conditions at the site;
• Physical evidence from the site, e.g., weapons fragments and soil, water, vegetation, human, or animal tissue samples;
• A record of the chain of custody during transportation of the evidence;
• Testimony of witnesses;
• Several analyses; and
• A review of the evidence by an expert panel.

While we base our investigative methodology (Figure 20) on these procedures, the passage of time since the Gulf War makes it difficult to obtain certain types of documentary evidence, and physical evidence often was not collected when an event occurred. Therefore, we cannot apply a rigid template to all incidents and must tailor each investigation to its unique circumstances. Accordingly, we designed our methodology to provide a thorough investigative process to define each incident's circumstances and determine what happened. Our methodology's major efforts are:

• To substantiate the incident;
• To document available medical reports about the incident;
• To interview appropriate people;
• To obtain information available to external organizations; and
• To assess the results.

Figure 20. Chemical warfare incident investigation methodology

A case usually starts with a report of a possible chemical warfare agent incident, often from a veteran. To substantiate the circumstances surrounding an incident, the investigator searches operational, intelligence, and environmental logs for documentation. This focuses the investigation on a specific time, date, and location, clarifies the conditions under which the incident occurred, and determines whether there is "hard," as well as anecdotal, evidence.

Alarms alone are not certain evidence of chemical warfare agent presence nor is a single observation sufficient to validate a chemical warfare agent's presence. The investigator looks for physical evidence collected at the time of the incident possibly indicating whether chemical agents were present in its vicinity. Such evidence might include tissue samples, body fluid samples, clothing, environmental samples of soil or vegetation, weapons parts, and Fox MM-1 tapes with properly documented spectrums.

The investigator searches available medical records to determine if the incident injured anyone and notes deaths, injuries, sicknesses, etc., near an incident's time and location. We ask medical experts to provide information about any possible chemical warfare agent casualties.

We interview those involved in or near the incident (participants or witnesses). First-hand witnesses provide valuable insight into the conditions surrounding the incident and the mind-sets of those involved, and are particularly important if physical evidence is lacking. We interview nuclear, biological, and chemical officers or specialists trained in chemical testing, confirmation, and reporting to identify the unit's response, tests conducted, injuries sustained, and reports submitted. We contact commanders to ascertain what they knew, what decisions they made about the events surrounding the incident, and their assessment of it. If appropriate, subject matter experts provide opinions on the capabilities, limitations, and operation of technical equipment and evaluate selected topics of interest.

Additionally, the investigator contacts agencies and organizations that may be able to further clarify details of the case, including, but not be limited to:

• Intelligence agencies that might be able to provide insight into events leading to the event, imagery of the area of the incident, and assessments of factors affecting the case;
• The clinical registries of the Departments of Defense and Veterans Affairs which may provide data about the medical condition of those involved in the incident; and
• Agencies capable of computer modeling meteorological and source characterization data in cases in which we suspect airborne dispersion of agent.

Once the investigation is complete, the investigator evaluates the available evidence to assess it objectively. The available evidence is often incomplete or contradictory, so we must look at it in the total context of what we know about the incident. Physical evidence collected when the incident occurred, for example, can be tremendously valuable to an investigation. We generally would give properly documented physical evidence the greatest weight in any assessment. The testimony of witnesses and contemporaneous operational documentation also is significant when making an assessment. Testimony from witnesses who also happen to be subject matter experts is usually more meaningful than testimony from untrained observers. Typically, we give secondhand accounts less weight than witnesses' testimony. If witnesses' accounts conflict, investigators look for other information supporting the witnesses' statements. Investigators evaluate the supporting information to determine how it corroborates any conflicting position. Generally, such supporting information will fit into a pattern corroborating one of the conflicting accounts of the incident over the others. Where the bulk of corroborating evidence supports one witness more than another, that person's information would be considered more compelling.

In each investigation our assessment relies on the investigator's evaluation of the available information. Because we do not expect to always have conclusive evidence, we have developed an assessment scale (Figure 21) ranging from Definitely Not to Definitely, with intermediate assessments of Unlikely, Indeterminate, and Likely. The investigator uses this scale to make an assessment, which is our best judgment, based on facts available on the report publication date; we reassess each case over time based on new information and feedback.

Figure 21. Assessment of Chemical Warfare Agent Presence

The standard for making the assessment is common sense: do the available facts lead a reasonable person to conclude that chemical warfare agents were present or not? If insufficient information is available, the assessment is Indeterminate until more evidence emerges.

The following information was extracted directly from a document prepared by the Chemical Propulsion Information Agency.[209]

Introduction

Inhibited red fuming nitric acid (IRFNA), known as type IIIB fuming nitric acid in the U.S., is used as a liquid propellant rocket engine oxidizer. It is light-orange to orange-red in color, clear, strongly fuming, and evolves toxic nitric acid vapor and yellow-red vapors of nitrogen oxides. Fuming nitric acids are unstable releasing nitrogen dioxide, nitric oxide, and nitric acid mist into the atmosphere. Fuming nitric acids are highly corrosive oxidizing agents and will vigorously attack most metals. They also react with many organic materials resulting in spontaneous combustion. IRFNA has the following chemical composition (by weight) and physical properties:

Health Hazards and Symptoms of Exposure

Toxicity

IRFNA, in contact with any surface of the body (skin, mucous membrane, eyes), destroys tissue by direct contact. It stains the skin or surface a yellow or yellowish-brown and sustained contact results in a chemical burn. The vapors are highly irritating and toxic to the respiratory tract. Immediately after exposure to dangerous concentrations, there may be coughing, increased respiratory rate, asthmatic-type breathing, nausea, vomiting, and marked fatigue. A fatal pulmonary edema may develop.

Special Medical Information

Exposure to dangerous atmospheric concentrations of the oxides of nitrogen may cause spasm of the terminal bronchioles and disturbances of reflexes causing respiration. Circulatory collapse may ensue, or the symptoms may subside and reappear several hours later with the onset of pulmonary edema. Certain signs indicating that severe lung damage has occurred may appear within the first few hours. These are an increase in platelets in the venous blood, often as great as 60 to 100 percent, a decrease in blood pressure, and an increase in the hemoglobin content of the blood. Spasmodic cough and dyspnea appearing several hours after the exposure are evidence of the development of pulmonary edema; bronchopneumonia may be a complication. IRFNA contact with the eyes causes irreparable damage within seconds.

Chronic Exposure

Chronic exposure to low concentrations of the oxides of nitrogen may produce wearing down and decay of the teeth, pulmonary emphysema, and chronic inflammation of the respiratory passages, often with ulceration of the nose or mouth.

Exposure Limits

Threshold Limit Value - Time Weighted Average (TLV� -TWA): A threshold limit value for IRFNA itself has not been established, however, the atmospheric threshold limit values for its more toxic components are as follows:

Threshold Limit Value - Short Term Exposure Limit (TLV� -STEL) values are as follows:

Emergency exposure limits for nitrogen dioxide are set as follows:

• 10 minutes at 30 ppm (54 mg/m3)
• 30 minutes at 20 ppm (36 mg/m3)
• 60 minutes at 10 ppm (28 mg/m3)

The following is a compilation of some key lessons learned by US investigators reviewing incidents at the Kuwaiti Girls’ School. These lessons learned are solely U.S. DOD in scope and are not intended to reflect the opinions or positions of other Departments or Governments.

1. Communication

Many individuals and organizations had contact with the tank; however, they did not always communicate with one another, nor did they always know of the others’ contact. This was primarily attributable to the various jurisdictions of each organization and the principle of need-to-know. A prime example is the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers which initially investigated the tank. Although the Corps had pertinent information that may have brought this issue to closure early on, it was left out of subsequent discussions.

Another lesson learned in the area of communication is that reporting solely to command elements rather than specific individuals involved does not always provide the closure desired. Institutional memory is held by individuals not organizations, which often have significant staff turnover. This was the case when the results of the British analysis of the samples on resin were relayed to Task Force Victory. The principals involved from Task Force Victory, including Lt. Col. Killgore, then-Capt. Johnson and the rest of the 54th Chemical Troop, had already left the theater of operations and were never notified of the results. Interviews with these individuals continually yielded the same outcome: that, to their knowledge, the tank contained chemical warfare agent. Conflicting reporting between those involved and the DOD/MoD, coupled with the fact that a final report was never generated, warranted an investigation into the matter. Notifying those individuals involved could have brought the matter to conclusion rapidly while providing immediate closure to many of the questions and concerns of those involved.

Finally, the need to disseminate necessary intelligence to units entering theater, not just those already in theater, should be addressed. Information regarding the CAM registering eight bars on mustard in the presence of IRFNA in Scud missile wreckage occurred in February of 1991. None of the U.S. forces interviewed could confirm receiving this report on the CAM. All of the US forces involved at the Kuwaiti Girls’ School entered theater after this message had been relayed. Had they been briefed about this upon entering theater, they may have questioned the results at the time of the testing.

2. Document All Reports Relating to a Potential Chemical Warfare/Biological Warfare Incident

A key lesson learned from this investigation is that all reporting relating to a potential chemical warfare/biological warfare incident should be documented. Regardless of whether or not it substantiates the allegation, all evidence should be recorded in written form with the ultimate goal of a formal report on the incident to be disseminated to those involved and other appropriate parties. This is particularly essential when there are many jurisdictions involved. Furthermore, this documentation needs to be recorded at the time of the incident with all initial and subsequent documentation passed up through the chain-of-command.

3. Doctrine, Tactics, Techniques, Procedures, Training and Requirements

The possibility that nitric acid, red fuming nitric acid, and inhibited red fuming nitric acid might cause on chemical weapons detectors such as the CAM to register a false positive should be determined as close as possible under battlefield conditions. This knowledge may precipitate a change in doctrine, training or equipment to account for these false positives and methods to reconfirm.

IRFNA is not the only substance with a possible effect on chemical warfare agent detectors. Thus, as many battlefield contaminants as possible should be tested. Operators need to be made aware of possible contaminants and overall sensitivity of the various types of detectors. Identifying the contaminants will enable potential alterations to be made in the scope of doctrine, tactics, techniques, procedures, training and requirements.

4. Coordination of Information Among Participants

When reviewing a possible chemical warfare/biological incident in which multiple sovereign parties are involved, investigators from all participant countries need to understand the operating procedures and policy guidelines for each country. The concerns expressed by members of the Senate committee and the Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Illnesses regarding the lack of contemporary information, combined with misunderstanding the United Kingdom’s code on release of information, may have been alleviated.

On Sept. 11, 2000, the Presidential Special Oversight Board recommended to the Special Assistant that the Kuwaiti Girls’ School Interim Case Narrative be published as a final report. The Board recommended a synopsis of the issues of concern highlighted in earlier meetings and correspondence by their staff be incorporated into the final report.

This report reflects the following changes:

• Acknowledges the tank may not have contained pure nitric acid, but more likely contained a mixture of nitric acid and other unknown substances or contaminants as a result of exposure to the environment (for example, water, sand, corrosives from the inside of the tank).
• Acknowledges that no evidence or specific test results prove definitively the tank contained the specific form of nitric acid, IRFNA, as indicated in the Interim Case Narrative.
• Corrects identification of the anti-ship missiles captured at the school to be Seersucker rather than Silkworm missiles.
• Clarifies the incorrect reporting of presence of phosgene oxime on the Fox tapes in a 1994 letter to the Chairman, Senate Committee on Banking Housing, and Urban Affairs.
• Adds more complete assessment of the Fox vehicle’s MM-1 spectra by subject matter experts.
• Revises the narrative to reflect the updated methodology and footnoting standards of the Office of the Special Assistant to the Under Secretary Of Defense (Personnel and Readiness) for Gulf War Illnesses, Medical Readiness, and Military Deployments.
• References new source documents to enhance the accuracy of the narrative.

1. Tab A explains acronyms and abbreviations, and contains a glossary.
2. Defense Intelligence Agency, Initial Intelligence Report 5380 005 91, Subject: "Silkworm Test Facility (U)," March 1991.
3. United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, Directorate of Military Survey, Sheet K7611, 5648-III, Al Ahmadi, Edition 5-GSGS.
4. Initial Report from commanding officer, 21st EOD Squadron, Subject: "Suspected Chemical Container," Aug. 7, 1991, p.1.
5. Letter from Passive Barriers, Ltd. employee, Subject: "Schools Search and Disposals Certificate," Aug.24, 1991, p. 1.
6. Lead sheet 5987, Interview with Kuwait desk officer, U.S. State Department, Sept. 10, 1997, p. 1.
7. The Seersucker is an upgrade of the Silkworm with a longer fuselage, a greater propellant capability, and, therefore, a greater range. Federation of American Scientists, Washington DC, web site: www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/missile/row (as of January 25, 2001); Defence Intelligence Agency, Initial Intelligence Report 5380 005 91, Subject: "Silkworm Test Facility (U)," March 1991, p.1.
8. Defense Intelligence Agency, RII-1488, Subject: "Mating Chem Warheads to Frogs/Silkworms," No date.
9. Memorandum for record by lead analyst regarding captured missiles at Kuwaiti Girls' School, Office of the Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, No Subject, Oct. 21, 1997, p. 1.
10. Joint Staff, Message, Subject: "Captive Foreign Hardware from Desert Storm," 121910Z September 1991, p. 1.
11. U.S. Navy, Message, Subject: "Distribution of Explosive Components from Desert Storm Captive Hardware," 291338Z October 1991, p. 1.
12. Memorandum for record by lead analyst regarding captured missiles at Kuwaiti Girls' School, Office of the Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, No Subject, Oct. 21, 1997, p. 1.
13. McDonnel, Janet, After Desert Storm, The U..S Army and the Reconstruction of Kuwait, Office of History, US Army Corps of Engineers, 1999, p. 150.
14. McDonnel, Janet, After Desert Storm, The U.S. Army and the Reconstruction of Kuwait, Office of History, US Army Corps of Engineers, 1999, p. 150.
15. Lead sheet 7213, Interview with safety officer, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, July 10, 1997, p. 2.
16. Lead sheet 7213, Interview with safety officer, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, July 10, 1997, p. 2.
17. Lead sheet 7005, Interview with Maj. Gen. Patrick Kelly, USA (Ret.), Nov. 13, 1997, p. 1.
18. Lead sheet 7213, Interview with safety officer, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, July 10, 1997, p. 2.
19. Lead sheet 6025, Interview with commander of the 146th Explosive Ordnance Disposal Detachment, Sept. 15, 1997, p. 2.
20. Interview with Maj. Jonathan Watkinson, Octo. 16, 1997, p. 1-2, 10. Royal Ordnance was a UK firm that effectively subcontracted the UK Ministry of Defence to have British military forces in theater assist with the clearance.
21. Lead sheet 6430, Interview with senior US EOD officer in theater, Oct. 15, 1997, p. 2.
22. Initial Report from commanding officer, 21st EOD Squadron, Subject: "Suspected Chemical Container," Aug. 7, 1991, p. 1; Interview with Maj. Jonathan Watkinson, Oct. 16, 1997, p. 8.
23. Initial Report from commanding officer, 21st EOD Squadron, Subject: "Suspected Chemical Container," Aug. 7, 1991, p. 1.
24. Initial Report from commanding officer, 21st EOD Squadron, Subject: "Suspected Chemical Container," Aug. 7, 1991, p. 1-2.
25. Interview with Maj. Jonathan Watkinson, Oct. 16, 1997, p. 9.
26. Brletich, Nancy R., Mary Jo Waters, Gregory W. Bowen, Mary Frances Tracy, Worldwide Chemical Detection Equipment Handbook, Chemical and Biological Defense Information Analysis Center, October 1995, p. 332. Copies of the Worldwide Chemical Detection Equipment Handbook may be purchased from the CBIAC. To order, please contact the CBIAC Administrator, via phone (410-676-9030), fax (410-676-9703), e-mail ([email protected]), or use the interactive request form on the CBIAC web site www.cbiac.apgea.army.mil (as of Oct. 19, 1999).
27. U.S. Army VII Corps, Remote Bulletin Board Service, E-mail message, Subject: "CAM Burnout," Feb. 19, 1991, @ 1741.
28. Initial Report from commanding officer, 21st EOD Squadron, Subject: "Suspected Chemical Container," Aug. 7, 1991, p. 1-2.
29. Interview with Maj. Jonathan Watkinson, Oct. 16, 1997, p. 15.
30. Interview with Maj. Jonathan Watkinson, Oct. 16, 1997, p. 14.
31. Brletich, Nancy R., Mary Jo Waters, Gregory W. Bowen, Mary Frances Tracy, Worldwide Chemical Detection Equipment Handbook, Chemical and Biological Defense Information Analysis Center, October 1995, p. 422; Interview with Maj. Jonathan Watkinson, Oct. 16, 1997, p. 14.
32. Initial Report from commanding officer, 21st EOD Squadron, Subject: "Suspected Chemical Container," Aug.7, 1991, p. 2.
33. Interview with Maj. Jonathan Watkinson, Oct. 16, 1997, p. 15.
34. Interview with Maj. Jonathan Watkinson, Oct. 16, 1997, p. 13, 10.
35. Subsequent Report from commanding officer, 21st EOD Squadron, Subject: "Chemical Exploitation Report," Aug. 18, 1991, Annex E, p. 1.
36. Interview with Major Jonathan Watkinson, October 16, 1997, p. 11.
37. Subsequent Report from commanding officer, 21st EOD Squadron, Subject: "Chemical Exploitation Report," Aug. 18, 1991, Annex E, p. 1.
38. Interview with Maj. Jonathan Watkinson, Oct. 16, 1997, p. 11.
39. Interview with Maj. Jonathan Watkinson, Oct. 16, 1997, p. 11.
40. Initial Report from commanding officer, 21st EOD Squadron, Subject: "Suspected Chemical Container," Aug. 7, 1991, p. 2.
41. Interview with Maj. Jonathan Watkinson, Oct. 16, 1997, p. 14-15.
42. Memorandum from Lt. Col. Donnie Killgore to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Chemical Biological Matters, Subject: "Suspect Chemical Container Found in Kuwait City, Kuwait in August 1991," July 29, 1994, p. 3-4.
43. For a detailed explanation of the Fox NBC reconnaissance vehicle see Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, Medical Readiness, and Military Deployments, "The Fox NBC Reconnaissance Vehicle" (Information Paper), March 14, 2001
44. Memorandum from Lt. Col. Donnie Killgore to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Chemical Biological Matters, Subject: "Suspect Chemical Container Found in Kuwait City, Kuwait in August 1991," July 29, 1994, p. 4.
45. Lead sheet 6025, Interview with commander of the 146th Explosive Ordnance Disposal Detachment, Sept. 15, 1997, p. 2.
46. Interview with Col. John Macel, Oct. 16, 1997, p. 5.
47. Lead sheet 6025, Interview with commander of the 146th Explosive Ordnance Disposal Detachment, Sept. 15, 1997, p. 2.
48. Task Force Victory was made up of the Third Infantry Division as the General Officer Headquarters, the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, an Evacuation Hospital, and 18 tenant activities; Memorandum from Lieutenant Colonel Donnie Killgore to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Chemical Biological Matters, Subject: "Suspect Chemical Container Found in Kuwait City, Kuwait in August 1991," July 29, 1994, p. 2.
49. Memorandum from Captain Michael F. Johnson to director, Combined Arms Training Directorate, Subject: "Iraqi Chemical Agents - Information Paper," Jan. 4, 1994, p. 1; Memorandum to commander, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, Subject: "Tasking Number 91-047," Aug. 7, 1991, p. 1.
50. Interview with Major Jonathan Watkinson, October 16, 1997, p. 27-28.
51. Memorandum from Capt. Michael F. Johnson to director, Combined Arms Training Directorate, Subject: "Iraqi Chemical Agents - Information Paper," Jan. 4, 1994, p. 1.
52. The exact date of this operation remains uncertain. The Fox tapes from the second operation are dated Aug. 9, 1991, as is the paperwork that documents when the samples were taken. We therefore believe that the operations took place on Aug.9, 1991.
53. Interview with Lt. Col. Donnie W. Killgore, Oct. 15, 1997, p. 8; Subsequent Report from commanding officer, 21st EOD Squadron, Subject: "Chemical Exploitation Report," Aug. 18, 1991, Annex C, p.1; Interview with Maj. Jonathan Watkinson, Oct.16, 1997, p. 20.
54. Subsequent Report from commanding officer, 21st EOD Squadron, Subject: "Chemical Exploitation Report," Aug. 18, 1991, p. 3.
55. Subsequent Report from commanding officer, 21st EOD Squadron, Subject: "Chemical Exploitation Report," Aug. 18, 1991, p. 3.
56. Interview with Maj. Jonathan Watkinson, Oct. 16, 1997, p. 19, 25.
57. Subsequent Report from commanding officer, 21st EOD Squadron, Subject: "Chemical Exploitation Report," Aug.18, 1991, p. 3.
58. Lead sheet 5982, Interview with US soldier from 54th Chemical Troop supporting the Fox testing, Aug. 15, 1997, p. 2.
59. Lead sheet 5982, Interview with US soldier from 54th Chemical Troop supporting the Fox testing, Aug.15 1997, p. 2. The Bomb Disposal Officer and Bomb Disposal Engineer extracted a fifth sample from the tank during the Fox testing in case more of the tank's liquid was required, but was not needed. It was added to the samples in the two bottles contained in the ammunition box. Watkinson, J. P., Subsequent report: "Chemical Exploitation Report," Aug. 18, 1991, p. 3.
60. Fox tapes produced at the Kuwaiti Girls' School, Aug. 9, 1991; see Tab H, p. 6-14.
61. Statement of troop commander of 1st Troop, 21st EOD Squadron, Subject: "Chemical Incident Sabahiyah Girls School, Kuwait 1991," Nov. 10, 1997, p. 3.
62. Lead sheet 5982, Interview with US soldier from 54th Chemical Troop supporting the Fox testing, Aug. 15, 1997, p. 1.
63. Statement of troop commander of 1st Troop, 21st EOD Squadron, Subject: "Chemical Incident Sabahiyah Girls School, Kuwait 1991," Nov. 10, 1997, p. 3.
64. Statement of troop commander of 1st Troop, 21st EOD Squadron, Subject: "Chemical Incident Sabahiyah Girls School, Kuwait 1991," Nov. 10, 1997, p. 3.
65. Memorandum from Captain Michael F. Johnson for director, Combined Arms Training Directorate, Subject: "Iraqi Chemical Agents - Information Paper," Jan. 4, 1994, p. 2.
66. Subsequent Report from commanding officer, 21st EOD Squadron, Subject: "Chemical Exploitation Report," Aug. 18, 1991, p. 4.
67. Subsequent Report from commanding officer, 21st EOD Squadron, Subject: "Chemical Exploitation Report," Aug. 18, 1991, Annex E, p. 1.
68. UK Ministry of Defence, Deposition of injured British soldier, Dec. 5, 1997, p. 4.
69. Lead sheet 6753, Interview with Maj. Michael F. Johnson, Nov. 3, 1997, p. 2.
70. Interview with Lt. Col. Donnie Killgore, Oct. 15, 1997, p. 14-15.
71. Letter from Assistant Secretary of Defense for Chemical/Biological Matters, No Subject, undated, p. 2.
72. Memorandum from Lt. Col. Donnie Killgore to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Chemical Biological Matters, Subject: "Suspect Chemical Container Found in Kuwait City, Kuwait in August 1991," July 29, 1994, p. 6. Although this source states Col. Macel made the contact, in 1998 during staffing of this original narrative, this was clarified by Col. Macel to indicate Maj. Watkinson actually contacted them.
73. Initial report from sampling team leader, Subject: "Sampling and Assessment of Suspected Chemical Container," Aug. 11, 1991, p. 1.
74. Memorandum from Persian Gulf War Illnesses Task Force to the Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, Subject: "Cleared Statement by UNSCOM on Kuwait Girl's School Tank," Jan. 22, 1998, p.1.
75. Initial report from sampling team leader, Subject: "Sampling and Assessment of Suspected Chemical Container," Aug. 11, 1991, p. 2.
76. Memorandum from Lt. Col. Donnie Killgore to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Chemical Biological Matters, Subject: "Suspect Chemical Container Found in Kuwait City, Kuwait in August 1991," July 29, 1994, p.7.
77. Memorandum from UK Ministry of Defence, Subject: "Clarification of the Sampling Team Leader's Previous Testimony," Dec. 17, 1997, p.1.
78. Subsequent report from commander, 21st EOD Squadron, Subject: "Chemical Exploitation Report," Aug. 18, 1991, p. 4; Interview with sampling team leader, Oct. 9, 1997, p. 12-13.
79. Preliminary Report from Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment (UK), Subject: "Analysis of Samples from Kuwait," Sept. 24, 1991 p.1.
80. Initial report from sampling team leader,: "Sampling and Assessment of Suspected Chemical Container," Aug. 11, 1991, p. 3.
81. Initial report from sampling team leader,: "Sampling and Assessment of Suspected Chemical Container," Aug. 11, 1991, p. 3.
82. Interview with sampling team leader, Oct. 9, 1997, p. 11.
83. Interview with sampling team leader, Oct. 9, 1997, p. 11.
84. Initial report from sampling team leader, Subject: "Sampling and Assessment of Suspected Chemical Container," Aug. 11, 1991, p. 4.
85. Interview with sampling team leader, Oct. 9, 1997, p. 9.
86. Initial report from sampling team leader, Subject: "Sampling and Assessment of Suspected Chemical Container," Aug. 11, 1991, p. 3.
87. Memorandum from UK Ministry of Defence, Subject: "Clarification of the Sampling Team Leader's Previous Testimony," Dec. 17, 1997, p.1.
88. Initial report from sampling team leader, Subject: "Sampling and Assessment of Suspected Chemical Container," Aug. 11, 1991, p. 3.
89. Initial report from sampling team leader, Subject: "Sampling and Assessment of Suspected Chemical Container," Aug. 11, 1991, p. 4.
90. Interview with sampling team leader, Oct. 9, 1997, p. 5-6.
91. Interview with Major Jonathan Watkinson, Oct. 16, 1997, p. 37.
92. Report from 21st EOD Squadron Group, Subject: "Report on the Resealing of the Salabiyah Chemical Container," Aug. 25, 1991, p. 2.
93. Subsequent Report from commanding officer, 21st EOD Squadron, Subject: "Chemical Exploitation Report," Aug. 18, 1991, p. 5.
94. Report from 21st EOD Squadron Group, Subject: "Report on the Resealing of the Salabiyah Chemical Container," Aug. 25, 1991, p. 1.
95. Interview with Major Jonathan Watkinson, Oct. 16, 1997, p. 35.
96. Report from 21st EOD Squadron Group, Subject:"Report on the Resealing of the Salabiyah Chemical Container," Aug. 25, 1991, p. 1.
97. Interview with Major Jonathan Watkinson, October 16, 1997, p. 43.
98. Report from 21st EOD Squadron Group, Subject:"Report on the Resealing of the Salabiyah Chemical Container," Aug. 25, 1991, p. 3-4.
99. Memorandum from Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment (UK), Subject: "Collection of Samples taken from Kuwaiti Girls High School," Dec. 8, 1997, p.1.
100. Preliminary report from Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment (UK), Subject: "Analysis of Samples from Kuwait," Sept. 24, 1991, p. 1.
101. Preliminary report from Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment (UK), Subject: "Analysis of Samples from Kuwait," Sept. 24, 1991, p. 1.
102. Interview with Colonel John Macel, Oct. 16, 1997, p. 11, 31.
103. Interview with Lieutenant Colonel Donnie Killgore, Oct. 15, 1997, p. 4-5.
104. Message from Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment, Porton Down, Subject: "Disposal of Tank of Nitric Acid in Kuwait," 301530Z Sept. 1991, p. 1.
105. Message from Headquarters, British Forces, Kuwait, Subject: "Disposal of Tank of Nitric Acid in Kuwait," PR271100Z Sept. 1991, p. 1.
106. Letter from Brown & Root International, Inc. to contracting officer, Kuwaiti Emergency Response Office, Subject: "Oxident Disposal at School," Oct. 30, 1991, p.1.
107. Letter from Brown & Root International, Inc. to contracting officer, Kuwaiti Emergency Response Office, Subject: "Oxident Disposal at School ,"Oct. 30, 1991, p. 2.
108. Letter from Passive Barriers Ltd. employee, Subject: "Container at Sabahiyah Girls School," Feb. 10, 1998, p. 1.
109. Letter from Passive Barriers Ltd. employee, Subject: "Container at Sabahiyah Girls School," Feb. 10, 1998, p. 1.
110. Testimony of Major Michael F. Johnson before the Subcommittee on Human Resources and Intergovernmental Relations, US House of Representatives, Dec. 10, 1996, p. 1.
111. Lead Sheet 6753, Interview with Major Michael F. Johnson, Nov. 3, 1997, p. 1.
112. US Senate, 103d Congress, 2d Session, Committee Staff Report (No. 3), Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, "US Chemical and Biological Warfare - Related Dual Use Exports to Iraq and Their Possible Impact on the Health Consequences of the Persian Gulf War," Oct. 7, 1994, p. 7-11, 18.
113. VII Corps Remote Bulletin Board Service, E-mail message, Subject: "CAM Burnout," Feb. 19, 1991, @ 1741.
114. Initial report from commanding officer, 21st EOD Squadron, Subject: "Suspected Chemical Container," Aug. 7, 1991, p. 1; Interview with Major Jonathan Watkinson, Oct. 16, 1997, p. 12.
115. Memorandum from Department of the Army, Chemical and Biological Defense Command, Subject: "Testing Response of Chemical Agent Detection Equipment to Red Fuming Nitric Acid," April 11, 1997, p. 3;
116. Interview with Maj. Jonathan Watkinson, Oct. 16, 1997, p. 14.
117. Memorandum from Department of the Army, Office of the Project Manager for NBC Defense Systems, No Subject, Sept.11, 1997, p. 1; Letter from Bruker Daltonics, Subject: "Analysis of Fox Tapes," Dec. 15, 1997, p. 1; Letter from National Institute of Standards and Technology, No Subject, Dec. 19, 1997, p. 1.
118. Letter from Assistant Secretary of Defense for Chemical/Biological Matters, No Subject, undated, p. 2.
119. Letter from Assistant Secretary of Defense for Chemical/Biological Matters, No Subject, undated, p. 2.
120. Memorandum from Captain Johnson to director, Combined Arms Training Directorate, Subject: "Iraqi Chemical Agents - Information Paper," Jan. 4, 1994, p. 2.
121. Lead sheet 6753, Interview with Maj. Michael F. Johnson, Nov. 3, 1997, p. 2.
122. U.S. Senate, 103d Congress, 2d Session, Committee Staff Report (No. 3), Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, "U.S. Chemical and Biological Warfare - Related Dual Use Exports to Iraq and Their Possible Impact on the Health Consequences of the Persian Gulf War," Oct. 7, 1994, p. 18.
123. Interview with Lt. Col. Donnie Killgore, Oct. 15, 1997, p. 22-23.
124. U.S. Senate, 103d Congress, 2d Session, Committee Staff Report (No. 3), Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, "U.S. Chemical and Biological Warfare - Related Dual Use Exports to Iraq and Their Possible Impact on the Health Consequences of the Persian Gulf War," Oct. 7, 1994, p. 18.
125. The U.S. Department of Defense could not provide the originals or copies of the Fox tapes nor the analysis of them by U.S. experts. Additionally, the UK provided letters describing their assessments and results, however, did not make available copies of the original reports. Thus, the committee could not review the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment's initial report on the laboratory analysis of the liquid samples from the tank because it was not provided to the committee for review.
126. For more information about the UK Code of Practice on Access to Government Information see www.mod.uk/policy/opengovt/policy.htm or www.homeoffice.gov.uk/foi/index.htm.
127. 60 Minutes, March 19, 1995; Ritter, John,"Gulf War Sequel: Claims, Counterclaims," USA Today, March 2, 1995, p. 8A; Cooper, Dale B., "Drumbeat of Denial," Soldier of Fortune, May 1997, p. 38-39; Eddington, Patrick G., Gassed in the Gulf, Washington, DC: Insignia Publishing Company, 1997, p. 48-49, 120-121, 126-129.
128. Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans' Illnesses, public meeting transcript, Charleston, South Carolina, May 7, 1997, p. 175-176.
129. Testimony of UNSCOM officials before the Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans' Illnesses, July 29, 1997, p. 5.
130. Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans' Illnesses, public meeting transcript, Alexandria, Virginia, Sept. 4, 1997.
131. Dettmer, Jamie, "Chemical Weapons Used in Gulf War," Evening Standard, Oct. 13, 1994, p. 23; Evans, Michael, "Allies Found Iraq Stored Blister Agent in Kuwait," The Times, Oct. 14, 1994, p. 15;
132. Sebastian, Tim, "Why is the Government Lying?," The Mail On Sunday - Night and Day, November 12, 1995, p. 1; UK Parliament, House of Commons, "Written Answers," January 25, 1995, p. 282.
133. Memorandum from Department of the Army, Office of the Project Manager for NBC Defense Systems, No Subject, Sept. 11, 1997, p. 2.
134. Memorandum from Department of the Army, Chemical and Biological Defense Command, Subject: "Testing Response of Chemical Agent Detection Equipment to Red Fuming Nitric Acid," April 11, 1997, p. 4.
135. Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans' Illnesses, public meeting transcript, Charleston, South Carolina, May 7, 1997, p. 170-171.
136. Memorandum from Department of the Army, Office of the Project Manager for NBC Defense Systems, No Subject, Sept. 11, 1997, p. 2.
137. Preliminary report from Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment (UK), Subject: "Analysis of Samples from Kuwait," Sept. 24, 1991, p. 1; Memorandum from Battelle, Subject: "Chemical Properties of Fuming Nitric Acid," March 18, 1998, p. 1; Sierra Nevada College, "Material Safety Data Sheets," web site: www.sierranevada.edu/facilities/safety/msdslocl/msds.html, (as of March 13, 2001), p.3.
138. Testimony of Fox subject matter expert, Chemical and Biological Defense Command before the Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans' Illnesses, May 7, 1997, p. 85.
139. Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, Military Readiness and Military Deployments, "The Fox NBC Reconnaissance Vehicle" (Information Paper), March 14, 2001
140. Lead sheet 23181, Meeting with Fox subject matter experts, Aug. 26, 1999, p. 4.
141. Letter from Bruker Daltonics, Subject: "Analysis of Fox Tapes," Dec. 15, 1997, p. 1-2.
142. Letter from National Institute of Standards and Technology, No Subject, Dec. 19, 1997, p. 1.
143. Memorandum from Department of the Army, Office of the Project Manager for NBC Defense Systems, No Subject, Sept. 11, 1997, p. 1.
144. Letter from Bruker Daltonics, Subject: "Analysis of Fox Tapes," Dec. 15, 1997, p. 1-2.
145. Memorandum from Department of the Army, Office of the Project Manager for NBC Defense Systems, No Subject, Sept. 11, 1997, p. 1-2.
146. Letter from National Institute of Standards and Technology, No Subject, Dec. 19, 1997, p. 1.
147. U.S. Army Field Manual 3-9, U.S. Navy Publication P-467, U.S. Air Force Manual 355-7, "Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds," December 12, 1990, chapter 2, p. 26.
148. U.S. Army Field Manual 8-285, U.S. Navy Medical Publication P-5041, U.S. Air Force Joint Manual 44-149, U.S. Marine Corps Fleet Marine Force Manual 11-11, "Treatment Of Chemical Agent Casualties and Conventional Military Chemical Injuries," Dec. 22, 1995, Glossary, Section II, Definitions and Terms, p. 4-5, web site www.nbc-med.org/SiteContent/MedRef/OnlineRef/FieldManuals/fm8_285/PART_I/index.htm (as of June 25, 1999).
149. U.S. Army Material Safety Data Sheet on HQ Mustard, Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD, June 30, 1995.
150. U.S. Army Field Manual 8-285, US Navy Medical Publication P-5041, U.S. Air Force Joint Manual 44-149, U.S. Marine Corps Fleet Marine Force Manual 11-11, "Treatment Of Chemical Agent Casualties And Conventional Military Chemical Injuries," Dec. 22, 1995, Glossary, Section II. Definitions And Terms, p. 5, web site www.nbc-med.org/SiteContent/MedRef/OnlineRef/FieldManuals/fm8_285/PART_I/ (as of June 25, 1999).
151. U.S. Army Material Safety Data Sheet, "Chemical Agent Monitor (CAM)," Dec. 2, 1999.
152. CBDCOM mission statement, web site www.sbccom.army.mil/hooah/pubs/cbdcom98.pdf (as of Sept. 2, 1999).
153. U.S. Army Field Manual 8-285, U.S. Navy Medical Publication P-5041, U.S. Air Force Joint Manual 44-149, U.S. Marine Corps Fleet Marine Force Manual 11-11, "Treatment Of Chemical Agent Casualties and Conventional Military Chemical Injuries," Dec. 22, 1995, Glossary, Section II, Definitions and Terms, p. 6, web site www.nbc-med.org/SiteContent/MedRef/OnlineRef/FieldManuals/fm8_285/PART_I/index.htm (as of June 25, 1999).
154. Webster Dictionary, Merriam-Webster, Incorporated, 1998, web site www.m-w.com/dictionary (as of June 25, 1999).
155. U.S. Army Field Manual 3-9, U.S. Navy Publication P-467, U.S. Air Force Manual 355-7, "Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds," Dec. 12, 1990, chapter 2, p. 27.
156. Defense Technical Information Center, Test Operations Procedure 8-2-555, "Chemical Agent Detector Kits," Dugway Proving Ground, Dugway, UT, April 28, 1989, p. 37.
157. U.S. Army Field Manual 3-9, U.S. Navy Publication P-467, U.S Air Force Manual 355-7, "Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds," Dec. 12, 1990, chapter 2, p. 46.
158. U.S. Army Field Manual 3-9, U.S. Navy Publication P-467, U.S. Air Force Manual 355-7, "Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds," Dec. 12, 1990, Chapter 2, p. 22-23.
159. Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, "Detection of Chemical Weapons: An overview of methods for the detection of chemical warfare agents," p. 4, web site www.opcw.nl/chemhaz/detect.htm (as of Oct. 12, 1999).
160. U.S. Army Field Manual 3-9, U.S. Navy Publication P-467, U.S. Air Force Manual 355-7, "Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds," Dec. 12, 1990, Chapter 2, p. 31.
161. Medical Dictionary, Merriam Webster, Incorporated, 1997, website www.intelihealth.com (as of 2/26/01).
162. Webster Dictionary, Merriam-Webster, Incorporated, 1998, website www.m-w.com/dictionary (as of June 25, 1999).
163. Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary, Merriam-Webster, 2001, web site: www.m-w.com (as of 2/26/01)
164. U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Publication 1-02, "Dictionary of Military Terms," April 6, 1999, p. 162, web site www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/data/e/02287.html (as of Sept. 2, 1999).
165. Medical Dictionary , Merriam Webster, Incorporated, 1997, website: www.intelihealth.com (as of 2/26/01).
166. Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "The Fox NBC Reconnaissance Vehicle" (Information Paper), March 14, 2001, p. 6
167. Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary, Merriam-Webster, 2001,web .site: www.m-w.com (as of 2/26/01)
168. U.S. Army Field Manual 3-9, U.S. Navy Publication P-467, U.S. Air Force Manual 355-7, "Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds," Dec. 12, 1990, chapter 2, p. 18.
169. U.S. Army Field Manual 3-9, U.S. Navy Publication P-467, U.S. Air Force Manual 355-7, "Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds," Dec. 12, 1990, chapter 2, p. 19.
170. U.S. Army Field Manual 3-9, U.S. Navy Publication P-467, U.S. Air Force Manual 355-7, "Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds," Dec. 12, 1990, chapter 2, p. 21.
171. U.S. Army Field Manual 3-9, U.S. Navy Publication P-467, U.S. Air Force Manual 355-7, "Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds," Dec. 12, 1990, chapter 2, p. 23.
172. U.S. Army Field Manual 3-9, U.S. Navy Publication P-467, U.S. Air Force Manual No 355-7, "Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds," Dec.12, 1990, Chapter 2, p. 17-18; U.S. Army Field Manual 8-285, U.S. Navy Medical Publication P-5041, U.S. Air Force Manual 44-149, U.S. Marine Corps Fleet Marine Force Manual 11-11, "Treatment Of Chemical Agent Casualties and Conventional Military Chemical Injuries," Dec. 22, 1995, Chapter 2, p. 1.
173. U.S. Army Field Manual 3-9, U.S. Navy Publication P-467, U.S. Air Force Manual 355-7, "Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds," Dec. 12, 1990, Chapter 2, p. 31.
174. U.S. Army Field Manual 3-9, U.S. Navy Publication P-467, U.S. Air Force Manual 355-7, "Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds," Dec. 12, 1990, Chapter 2, p. 40-41.
175. U.S. Army Field Manual 3-9, U.S. Navy Publication P-467, U.S. Air Force Manual 355-7, "Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds," Dec. 12, 1990, Chapter 2, p. 33-36.
176. U.S. Army Material Safety Data Sheet on HQ Mustard, Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD, June 30, 1995.
177. U.S. Army Field Manual 3-9, U.S. Navy Publication P-467, U.S. Air Force Manual 355-7, "Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds," Dec. 12, 1990, Chapter 2, p. 30.
178. U.S. Army Material Safety Data Sheet on HQ Mustard, Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD, June 30, 1995.
179. U.S. Army Field Manual 3-9, U.S. Navy Publication P-467, U.S. Air Force Manual 355-7, "Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds," Dec. 12, 1990, Chapter 2, p. 37-38.
180. Webster Dictionary copyright (c) 1998 by Merriam-Webster, Incorporated, website www.m-w.com/dictionary (as of May 3, 1999).
181. U.S. Army Field Manual 8-285, U.S. Navy Medical Publication P-5041, U.S. Air Force Joint Manual 44-149, U.S. Marine Corps Fleet Marine Force Manual 11-11, "Treatment Of Chemical Agent Casualties and Conventional Military Chemical Injuries," Dec. 22, 1995, Glossary, Section II, Definitions and Terms, p. 11, website www.nbc-med.org/SiteContent/MedRef/OnlineRef/FieldManuals/fm8_285/PART_I/index.htm (as of June 25, 1999).
182. U.S. Army Field Manual 3-9, U.S. Navy Publication P-467, U.S. Air Force Manual 355-7, "Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds," Dec. 12, 1990, Chapter 2, p. 39.
183. Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary, Merriam-Webster, 2001, website: www.m-w.com (as of 2/26/01)
184. Brletich, Nancy R., Mary Jo Waters, Gregory W. Bowen, Mary Frances Tracy, Worldwide Chemical Detection Equipment Handbook, Chemical and Biological Defense Information Analysis Center, October 1995, p. 421-424.
185. U.S. Army Technical Manual, 43-0001-26-1, "Army Equipment Data Sheets Chemical Defense Equipment," May 12, 1982, p. 1-25.
186. Brletich, Nancy R., Mary Jo Waters, Gregory W. Bowen, Mary Frances Tracy, Worldwide Chemical Detection Equipment Handbook, Chemical and Biological Defense Information Analysis Center, October 1995, p. 430-431. See also Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "M256 Series Chemical Agent Detector Kit" (Information Paper), July 23, 1999.
187. Brletich, Nancy R., Mary Jo Waters, Gregory W. Bowen, Mary Frances Tracy, Worldwide Chemical Detection Equipment Handbook, Chemical and Biological Defense Information Analysis Center, October 1995, p. 412. See also Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "M8A1 Automatic Chemical Agent Alarm" (Information Paper), Oct.30, 1997.
188. Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "Mission Oriented Protective Posture (MOPP) and Chemical Protection" (Information Paper), Oct. 30, 1997, p. 3-4.
189. U.S. Army Field Manual 3-4, U.S. Marine Corps Fleet Marine Force Manual 11-09, "NBC Protection," May 29, 1992, Chapter 2, p. 4.
190. Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, Medical Readiness, and Military Deployments, "The Fox NBC Reconnaissance Vehicle" (Information Paper), March 14, 2001, p. 6, 10-11, Bruker-Franzen Analytik GMBH, Chapter 2, copyright 1987.
191. U..S Army Field Manual 3-9, U.S. Navy Publication P-467, U.S. Air Force Manual 355-7, "Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds," Dec. 12, 1990, p. 30.
192. Kenkel, John, Analytical Chemistry for Technicians, 2nd ed., Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, Inc., 1994, p. 282-283.
193. U.S. Army Field Manual 8-285, U.S. Navy Medical Publication P-5041, U.S. Air Force Joint Manual 44-149, U.S. Marine Corps Fleet Marine Force Manual 11-11, "Treatment Of Chemical Agent Casualties and Conventional Military Chemical Injuries," Dec. 22, 1995, Glossary, Section II, Definitions and Terms, p. 14, website www.nbc-med.org/SiteContent/MedRef/OnlineRef/FieldManuals/fm8_285/PART_I/index.htm (as of Nov. 22, 2000).
194. Webster Dictionary, Merriam-Webster, Incorporated, 1998, website www.m-w.com/dictionary (as of April 2, 2001).
195. Medical Dictionary copyright (c) 1997 by Merriam Webster, Incorporated, website www.intelihealth.com (as of Feb. 26, 2001).
196. CW Procedural Text for Chemical CORPS Field Laboratories, Book 1, Part I, Chemistry of CW Agents, Chemical Corps, Chemical and Radiological Laboratories, Army Chemical Center, MD, Jan. 7, 1954, p. 294; U.S. Army Material Safety Data Sheet on HQ Mustard, Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD, June 30, 1995.
197. U.S. Army Field Manual 8-285, U.S. Navy Medical Publication P-5041, U.S. Air Force Joint Manual 44-149, U.S. Marine Corps Fleet Marine Force Manual 11-11, "Treatment Of Chemical Agent Casualties and Conventional Military Chemical Injuries," Glossary, Section II, Definitions and Terms, p. 17, Dec. 22, 1995, web site www.nbc-med.org/SiteContent/MedRef/OnlineRef/FieldManuals/fm8_285/PART_I (as of Aug. 23, 1999).
198. U.S. Army Field Manual 3-9, U.S. Navy Publication P-467, U.S. Air Force Manual 355-7, "Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds," Dec.12, 1990, Chapter 2, p. 19.
199. Taken from the SBCCOM mission statement, web site www.sbccom.army.mil/about/mission.htm (as of Sept. 2, 1999).
200. U.S. Army Field Manual 3-9, U.S. Navy Publication P-467, U.S. Air Force Manual 355-7, "Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds," Dec. 12, 1990, chapter 2, p. 21.
201. U.S. Army Field Manual 3-9, U.S. Navy Publication P-467, U.S. Air Force Manual 355-7, "Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds," Dec. 12, 1990, chapter 2, p. 18.
202. U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Publication 1-02, "Dictionary of Military Terms," April 6, 1999, web site www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/data/t/06258.html (as of Sept. 2, 1999).
203. U.S. Department of Defense , Joint Publication 1-02, "Dictionary of Military Terms," April 6, 1999, web site www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/data/u/06599.html (as of Nov. 4, 1999).
204. U.S. Army Field Manual 3-9, U.S. Navy Publication P-467, U.S. Air Force Manual 355-7, "Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds," Washington, DC, Dec. 12, 1990, p. 112.
205. U.S. Army Field Manual 3-9, U.S. Navy Publication P-467, U.S. Air Force Manual 355-7, "Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds," Dec. 12, 1990, chapter 2, p. 23, 112.
206. U.S. Army Field Manual 3-9, U.S. Navy Publication P-467, U.S. Air Force Manual 355-7, "Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds," Dec. 12, 1990, p. 112.
207. U.S. Army Field Manual 3-9, U.S. Navy Publication P-467, U.S. Air Force Manual 355-7, "Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds," Dec.12, 1990, chapter 2, p. 23.
208. "Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction," April 29, 1997. This chemical weapons convention opened for signature in Paris, France, on January 13, 1993. As of June 26, 2001, 174 states have signed, ratified, or acceded to it. The United States signed on Jan. 13, 1993, and ratified the Convention on April 25, 1997. Part XI of the convention, "Investigations in Cases of Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons," details some of the procedures. We found other protocols and guidelines in Methodology and Instrumentation for Sampling and Analysis in the Verification of Chemical Disarmament, The Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, Helsinki, Finland, 1985; Verification Methods, Handling, and Assessment of Unusual Events in Relation to Allegations of the Use of Novel Chemical Warfare Agents, Consultant University of Saskatchewan in conjunction with the Verification Research Unit of External Affairs and International Trade Canada, March 1990; and Handbook for the Investigation of Allegations of the Use of Chemical or Biological Weapons, Department of External Affairs, Department of National Defence, Health and Welfare Canada, and Agriculture Canada, November 1985. U.S. Army Field Manual 3-4, U.S. Marine Corps Fleet Marine Force Manual 11-9, "NBC Protection," May 1992; US Army Field Manual 8-285, U.S. Navy NAVMED P-5041, US Air Force Manual 44-149, US Marine Corps Fleet Marine Force Manual 11-11 (adopted as NATO Field Manual 8-285), "Treatment of Chemical Agent Casualties and Conventional Military Chemical Injuries," Dec. 22, 1995; U.S. Army Field Manual 19-20, "Law Enforcement Investigations," Nov. 25, 1985; and other DOD investigational procedures contributed ideas in developing this methodology.
209. Chemical Propulsion Information Agency, "Liquid Propellants" Hazards of Chemical Rockets and Propellants, Vol. III, September 1984, p. 15-1 to 15-15.
210. Indicates Captain Johnson saw tapes but did not have time to examine their contents.